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OVERVIEW
The century ot enlightenment vas drawing to a
surviving the upheavals ot the French Revolution.

close~

Europe was

Napoleon

Bonaparte~

the young hero of the Italian Campaign, having im_posed the Treaty ot
Campo J'ormio, had begun work on the Congress of Rastadt, and vu seeking
new domains ot action to match his creative imagination.

In his mind,

he could perceive the endless string ot those fascinating empires ot antiquity magically garlanded in an interminable succeasion. 1
His next expedition vas to take him to the land ot the Pharaohs and
the Cannaani tea, later to become part ot the Ottoman Empire, that 'sick

man • ot Europe whose agony alone would last over a century.
At this period, the Os'!ll&lllis' domination still extended widely,

over mo1t varied and renowned regions:

the Nile, the Tigris and the

Euphrate•, the proverbial tertility ot whose valleys appeared as a constant challenge to the desert.

Mount Ararat, Lebanon' a highest peak,

which seems, "fallin& into the sea"

2

and ottering, at the same time, "a

refuge and a.n onrture, " 3 to give Lebanon that quality whose beauty since
biblical times, both poets and vri ters have ceaselessly chanted;
beauty of its cedars and the holy valleys.

~utros Dib,

Et~re,

Vol.

m,

the

4

"Le Drute Palestinian," Chronique de Politique
No. 1 (1968), PP. 1-lT.

2nerre Rondot, L' Islam et lea Mus!,,!!'!! d' aujourd'hui (Paris:
Editions de l'Orante, 195~), P. 15.
3Ibid.

4Dib, P. 1.
iii

Upon his return, the First Consul was to retrace the crossing of
the Alps;

before Tyre would come Sidon and B;yblos, 'Cradl.e of the

Alphabet' ;

later, Beryte, 'Mother of Laws' ;

elsewhere, Mecca and

Medina, those metropolis of the desert converted to sanctuaries of a
great religion that hundreds and thousands venerate; 1 then Damascus,
the beginning of one of the greatest and most rapid conquests ever
then Baghdad, heir to Nineveh and Babylonia, seat of the Cali-

known;

phate and wisdom.

Then, Cairo and Istanbul., the continuation of

Byzantium ••• to these evocative names which are reminiscent of the
entire chapters of the history of civilization, should there be added
Jordan, Nazareth, .Bethlehem. and Jerusalem?

2

The fascinating effect of this spectacular portrayal of the Orient
must have been profound when Bonaparte exclaimed, "there never have been
great empires indeed, but in the Orient, next to which Europe is a molehill".3
However, Napoleon Bonaparte was not an exception in the West.
When welcoming Ferdinand de Lesseps at the French Academy, Ernest
Rena.n declAred that, by cutting the Isthmus of Suez, would he change not
only the face of the continent, but also the site of future battlefields.

4

Just to say that the present is processed out of the past is
lx>ib, P. l.

2

Ibid.

3Ibid.
4
Ibid.' P. 4.
iv

insufficient, in this case "the law of history needs a special adaptation, a reinforcement in the sense that a permanent presence of the
1
past is present in the East." Hence, the complexity of the Palestine
problem, as each question and each detail finds its roots deepened in
2
the remote millenia.

1Dib, P. 4.
2

Ibid.
y
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INTRODUCTION
Any

attempt at a viable approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict - the

most complex and heart-rending drama of our epoch - must take into
account passionate and biased views, with very great distortion of facts.
This assessment of the dynamics in contemporary Palestinian
experience, within the context of the Arab-Israeli association, seeks to
trace the salient features of present realities.

It returns to the near

past, where ambitions of supremacy and interplay of imperialistic interests may be said to have relentlessly worsened Arab-Israeli relations.
It likewise traces the rise of Jewish nationalism in the Diaspore.,
as well as that of the Arab nationalism in certain provinces of the
Ottoman Empire.
While stressing the effect of these forces in Palestine, the focus
is on British Palestine policy.
Declaration:

That policy is published in the Balfour

the idea of a. state within a. state, the so-called "Jewish

National Home" in Arab Palestine.
With regard to the general treatment, the subject is presented in a
strict chronological arrangement but, in order to explain activities
connected with one another, a retrospective glance has from time to time
been taken at an episode or a. personality.
The events of 1948 were responsible for Arab bitterness against
Occidental political underhandedness;

those of 1956, created in Egypt,

as well as in other Arab countries, a precedence of mistrust of the
Occidental powers.

It also marked the beginning of the Soviet flirtation
1

2

with the Arab World.

Furthermore, Egypt's intra-Arab politics ou the one

hand. and Israel's threat to overthrow the Syrian regime on the other,
led in different ways. to the culmination of the Third Arab-Israeli War.
The Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967, therefore, as the climax of
Palestinian political turbulence, illustrates this all-time political
paradox in the Palestinian drama.
Retrospect!vel.y, the germs or the 1967 War can be found in the
Suez-phobia. ot the 1956 triangle atta.ek by .Angl.o-ll'ralleo-Israel;

and the

kernel of the 1956 crisis in the proclamation of the Sta.te of Israel, in

1948.
Furthermore, this stu4y aaa!ysea the developments following the
erea.tion or the State ot Israel in Arab Palestine.

The purpose is not so

mueh to shed light on past events but 1 more importantly. to show that
from the bitter experiences ot the past, we may be able to predict the
direction in which the Jewish State will have to move, it it is to live
in a durable peace.
The United Nations warned Israel that their victory in the 1967 War,
"could turn out to be no more than one successfUl battle in a long and
1
losing war. "

Without the development of policies such as these that

will be indicated here, this warning would surely be vindicated.

1

"Editorial," The Economist, Vol. CCXXIV, No. 64662 (July, 1967).

CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL PROFILE

Pre-1900 Developments
Convergence of National AsEir,ations.--There is a strange symmetry

ot events that runs through the renaissance of Judeo-Arab national movemente, until their fateful encounter in the Holy Land;

whose political

problems, by virtue of their complexity, tended to be at once intensely
interesting and immensely critical;

thus, Palestine became the battle-

field of European politics.
A renaissance of both peoples occurred in the last part of the
19th century:

in both cases such an awakening first appeared in a re-

birth of literature;

both groups found the expression of their aims in

the same pol! tical events and uniquely, in the same geographical region.
It is remarkable, however, that Jewish nationalism manifested it1
self in the dispersion, having neither the unifying force or a race or
territory, nor a common language;

while "immured in a hostile environ-

ment,"2 it reawakened to national consciousness and gave birth to a
modern political movement, "like green shoots breaking from a petrified
1 It is generally believed that Judaism is a religion, not a race.
The Jews are by origin Semi tee but the modern Israelis are of European
origin by long residence in Europe, who migrated to Israel. ("cited by")
Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et Arabes, 3000 ans d'histoire (Parisa Flammarion, 1968), P. 15.
2Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfilment:
(London: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 19 9 , P. 5.
3

4
forest. "

1

Piy contrast, the Arab national sentiment was expressed by a

homogeneous people who had never left their native land.

The role of

religion in the elaboration of their respective aims was also different:
the

~1osaie

religion tended to confine the Jewish people of the Die.spora,

to borrow Professor Toynbee's expression, within a 'fossilized society'.
However, Islam had not only unified the Arabs;
together the non-Arab element of the East.

it had also brought

Arabism, and its Golden Age,

wa.s rounded on a common religion, so that tour centuries of Turkish

occupation le:rt no adverse effect on Arab patriotism;
only Moslem patriotism."

since Arabs "knew

2

It is also interesting that, like the phoenix with no secret, both
Arabs and Jews emerged from the ashes ot their respective glorious pasts,
and, in a curious way met in the Prophets' land.
The most pain:f'ul aspect of this strange encounter is the un:f'ortunate tact that a true resurrection of the two opposing elements takes
place simultaneously. 3
This is precisely the paradox in the history of the V.iddle East,
when the question of Jews and Arabs enters into its present phase and
leads us to the core of the contemporary conflict in Palestine.

~oestler, P. 5.
2
Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et Arabes, 3000 ans d'histoire (Paris:
Flammarion, 1968)~ P. 73

~ric Rouleau et al., Israel et les Arabes, le 3e Combat (Paris:
Edition de Seuil, 1967), P. 170.

5
The People Without Land'. 1 --The nostalgia for Zion had certa.inly kindled the minds of the Jews ever since the "destruction of the
temple and the dispersion. n

2

The unceasing chant of 'next year in

Jerusalem' vas profoundly rooted in the Jewish people of the Diaspora
and to some extent symbolized the mystic religious drive of the

Israelites. 3 Like the mingling of the temporal and the spiritual in the
Orient, this blend of mysticism and national aspirations vas instilled
in the Jewish soul.

It could also be regarded "as an extreme case of

homesickness of expatriate communities, mixed with mankind's archaic
yearning for a lost paradise, for a mythological Golden Age which is the
root of all Utopias, from Spa.rtacus' Sun-State to Rerzl' s Zionism. "

4

Napoleon Bonaparte vas among the first of the gentiles who, during
a short visit to Palestine, evoked the idea of reconstituting a Jewish
nation in the Holy Land. 5 Similarly, Enfa.ntine, nicknamed 'Prophet of
Zionism' , while in Egypt for the inauguration of the work of the Suez
Isthmus in 1836, had contemplated the possibility of the rebirth of
Israel as a nation.

Returning to France, he persuaded his disciple,

the Jewish businessman, Eiohtal, to attract the interest of Chancellor
Metternich towards the realization of this project.
1

But Enfantine's

Isrs.el Zangri.ll' s famous slogan "Give the People Without Land,
the Land Without People." ("cited by") Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et
Arabes, 3000 ans d 1 histoire (Paris: Flamm3rion, 1968), P. 2.

2Ibid., P. 25.
3Ibid., P. 60.

4Koestlerp P. 3.
5Alem, P. 60.

efforts failed.

6

1

As far back

aa 1839, the British had envisaged the possibility or

re-establishing a Jewish nation in Palestine.

"The Protestants in

general estimated such a restoration in conformity with the Holy Scrip2
tures. " The British Government too, welcOJMd this idea in order to
counterbalance French and Russian religious undertakings in Palestine.
At this period, the British had occupied Aden, the Southern exit to the
Red Sea.
Pal..merston' 1 e:f'tort1 in the early 184oa to interest the Sublime
Porte in the restoration ot the Jeva to Palestine have as part or their
background an earlier phase of Anglo-French rival.r,y in the Levant •
.Af'ter the s,-rian Epi1ode or l84o-41, Palmerston was determined
that Mohammad Ali should not succeed, with French connivance, in making
himself' muter o':f' Syria and Egypt.

Mohammad Ali's revolt had to be

checked, it the Ottoman's insecure empire were to be saved and the
French discouraged in their dreama or the emergence or a great Arab
state under Egyptian leadership and J'rench patronage. 3 With this in
mind, Palmerston made his tirst move in the direction or intereating
Turkey in the Jewish settlement in Palestine.

In a dispatch to the

British .Ambaasaclor in Constantinople, dated ll August 1840 (the dq ot
the expulsion or Mohammad Ali trom Syria and the first appearance or a
British squadron in the port or Beirut) t it

Ya8

stated that "there

exists at present among the Jews dispersed over Europe, a atrong notion
l

Ala, P.

2

6o.

Ibid.

3Ibid., P. 61

7

that the time is approaching when their nation is to return to Palestine

...

It is well known that the Jews of Europe possess great wealth •••

The Jewish people, it returning under the sanction and protection of the
Sul.tan, would be a check upon any future evil designs of Mohammad Ali or
his successors ••• "1
It is interesting to note that Palmerston's estimate of the Jewish
wealth and influence is emphasised in this dispatch;

the idea that the

Jews were a force in the world and could be uset'ul friends was to reappear over and over again in ~itish policy towards Palestine during
t

the years 1916-1917.

2

Shortly after this COJIIIIunication, Benjamin Disraeli, who

YU

lltill

at the dawn of his bright political career, wrote his tirat Zionist
novel, entitled Tucred. 3
In l84o, a notable English Jew, Sir Moses Montetiore, proposed to

Lord Palmerston the establishment of a Jewish e.gricul.tural project in
Palestine.

4 Similarly, in 1860, Ernest Laharanne, Pri"f'ate Secret&r7 to

Napoleon III, published a brochure, La lfoUTe;J.;e Qp.estiom. d' Orient, in
which he appealed to the Jews to devote theuelvea to the rehabilitation

ot Palestine, "under the sacred shield ot France, the emancipator". 5
In 1878, the British troops l&Dded in Cyprus.

lnib, P.
2

Although it was

4.

Alem, P. 61.

3~., P. 6o.

4simon Jargy, Ouerre et Paix en Palestine ou l'histoire du conflit

isre.elo-arabe, 1211-19()7 (Pa.ria: Editions du Seuil, 1~7}, P. 16.

5Alem, P. 60.

8

meant to be a temporary occupation necessitated by the offensive overturea of the Tzar's armies against the Ottoman Sultan, the strategic
nature of the Suez Canal and its proximity to Cyprus made it a lasting
one.

With the British occupation or ESJPt in 1882 - the nodal point of

Cyprus-Aden axis, the circle was conveniently closed. 1
In 1884, the year of the :first congress of the "Lovers of Zion 1 11
the Russian 'putsch' reaohed the Oasis of Merv in Central Asia, coming
dangerously close to the borders of India.

2

The British navy came into

action •••
In 1889, the road to India vas once again threatened, in another
corner of the world:

the French were at Fachod&.

Once again the British

uvy came into action ••• At the same time, bargaining& were under way
for concessions of the Baghdad railway contract. 3 The motive behind
this project vas apparently, and even ostensibly, beyond a purely commercial enterprise.

In :tact, more than one authorized source in Oel"DI&Zl7

had admitted that the motive behind the railway project vas the German

preoccupation with a. hypothetical conflict with Britain, in order to
neutralize the latter's presence on the banks of the Suez Canal.

4 Inci-

dentally, Britain occupied the Suez Canal at the outbreak of the First
World War, when Turkey entered the war as an ally of Germany.
The brilliant but eccentric Laurence Olephant, on the other hand,
came forward with an ambitious plan for the settlement of the Jews on a

lw_b, P. 4.
2

Ibid.

3Ibid.
4Ibid.

9
vast tract of land east of Jordan.

An English publicist, with the sup-

port of the British Prime Minister, Beaconsfield, and the Foreign
Minister, Salisb'I.U'Y', Laurence Olephant contacted the Sublime Port on the
subject of the creation of a Jewish home in the Ottoman domain of
Palestine.

Negotiations were progressing favourably.

However, they

were interrupted by the deterioration of the Anglo-Turkish relations. 1
Thus, none of the well-meaning efforts of either the gentiles or the
Jews of the pre-Zionist era gave the desired result.
Similarly, the efforts of a spiritual Zioni:::t Asher Ginsberg, who
had rightly prophesied that the establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine would inevitably involve compromises and would lead to bitter
violence, proposed instead the creation of a symbolic spiritual center
for the Jewish people, in the Promised Land.

Although this theory had

attracted some support from other Jewish intellectuals, such as Martin
Buber and Juda Magnes, the idea of spiritual Zionism remained stillborn.
Finally, the re-awakening of Jewish national feelings was accelerated and intensified by the appearance of the Polish, Bulgarian and
Serbian national movements.

A natione.l language was announced during

the last part of the 19th century and Hebrew flourished as the literary
language of Eastern Europe.

Thus, the movement was diverted from a

cultural to a political plane, and modern Zionism was born. 3

However,

modern Zionism did not as yet succeed in formulating the actual doctrine
1

Alem, P.

62.

~acoutoure, Israel et les Arabes, le 3e combat, P. 9.
~anhun Sokolow, Histor,y of' Zionism 1600-1Q18 (London:
Green and '"Company, 1919) , Vol; I, P. 10.

Longman&,

2

1.0

.
. h peepl.e 1n
• a given
•
t erri'tory. l.
of the regrouping
o f the J ew1s
The first Zionist visionaries of the 19th century had a rather
vague idea about Erzeth Israel.
precise form.

Later, however, the idea assumed a more

Even Theodore Herzl, who is considered to be the father

of Zionism, had not contemplated, in the beginning, the idea of a return
to Palestine.
was

~~oses

Perhaps the first who visualized a return to Palestine

Hess, whose Rom und Jerusalem, in which he quotes extensively

from La.haranne, was to become a Zionist classic.

In 1862, !>toses Hess

published his brochure in which he foresaw the birth of a Jewish nation
in Palestine.

He was treated as a visionary and frowned upon as a

dangerous heretic.

But, after the pogroms in Russia following the

assassination of Tzar Alexander II in 1881, the tide was turned in
favour of his project. 2
The following year a Jewish doctor of Odessa, Leo Pinsker, published the first Zionist manifesto, the Auto-emancipation. 3 This pamphlet depicts very clearly the collective psychology of fear and repugnance, and the experiences of a people dispersed by the Romans, who were
now reappearing "under the sinister aspect of the dead walking with the
4 Drawing a rather sad portrait of the phantom people, Pinsker
living."
asserted that the essential problem of the Jews lay in the acquisition
of a land.

But at the same time they would have to content themselves

1

Sokolow, P. 10.
2
Ibid., P. 16.

3Leo Pinsker, L'Auto-Emancipation (Berlin: W. Issleib, 1882), P. 12.
('I'raduction Fran~aise et introduction de Andr~ Neher, J'rusalem 1960).
4I •
P 8
~.,

..

11
with the illusion of restoring the ancient Judea:
The actual aim of our efforts should not be the Holy Land but
We will convey there the idea of' our God and the :Bible:
they alone made of our ancient land the Holy Land. The rest is
meaningless, whether Jerusalem or Jordan. 1
a land.

Of course, Pinsker did not object to the idea of re-establishing the

Jewish nation in Palestine.

:But, equally, he envisaged other alterna-

tives, such as Syria and North America~ where vast possibilities for
colonization existed. 2 However, Pinsker underestimated the enormous
difficulties that accompanied his proposal.

He well understood that his

plans ca.ll.ed tor years and years of' struggle and forbearance.

But

he

admitted that nwhen one has wandered for thousands of years, nothing
will ever seem too long. " 3
Auto-emancipation contained both the definition and the justif'ication of' Zionism.

In later years, Ben-Gurion expressed the idea that,

"a.s far as the forerunners of modern Zionism are concerned, and the

force with which this idea hu been expressed, ve must befittingly give
to Leo Pinsker the first place among the theoreticians of Zionism."
nThis brochure, Auto-emancipation continues to be the most remarkable
cla.ssic of Zionist literature. "

4

When Theodore Herzl came upon this

brochure, he declared that had he read it sooner, he would not have

1-pinsker, P. 8.
2

Alem, P. 64.

Jpinsk.er, P. 15.

4David Ben-Gurion, Le Peupl~. et l'Eta.t d'Isra.el (Paris: Les
Editions de Minuit, 1959), P. 20.

12

written his pamphlet The Jewish State. 1
However~

revolution.

it was not Auto-emancipation which ushered in the Zionist

The brochure was read throughout Europe, but it aroused more

reservations than interest. This, too~ "was laughed away as a whimsical
aberration." 2 The majority of people were not yet reaay to accept the
ineluctable character of anti-semitism.

Far from being discouraged by

the critics, Pinsker was determined to transform his ideas into concrete
actions.

Thus, in 1884, the first Congress of the "Lovers of Zion"

(Hoveri Sion) took place in the city of Pinsk under the auspices of Leo
Pinsker.

It was founded to reorganize Jewish emigration from Russia.

This congress is generally considered as the point of departure of the
movement, if not the very idea of poli tioa.l Zionism. 3 Soon afterwards
the ramifications of this society's activities spread all over Eastern
and resulted in the financing of important operations.

Europe

Pinsker's help, the students' association
thus the first Aliy·a was created.

~illu

With

was formed in Jaffa and

Subsequent persecutions in Russia in

1890 and 1891, particularly the expulsion of the Jews from l<foscow, reinforced the first Aliya with new and more experienced contingents.

4

The kernel of a 'Jewish nation' and the idea that it could not
exist without a territory, is explicit in Pinsker's train of thought,
when he asserts that, "we have to give up the foolish illusion of
1

Theodore Herzl, ,!he Complete Diaries of Theodore Herzl (Uew York:
Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), 5 Vol.~ P. 38.
2

Alem, P. 70.

3sokolow, P. 49.
4
Al.em, P. 67.

13
accomplishing the Providential mission through dispersion.

As long as we

don't have a home like other nations, we have to give up that noble hope
1
of becoming men like others."

"Only self-emancipation of the Jewish

people as a nation would have any effect on our situation.
national Jewish question must have a national solution."

The inter-

2

Birth of Political Zionism. -:-As the first immigrants ' Ody'sfe;r
came to an end at the toot of the rugged hills of Judea, political
Zionism was officially born with the intervention of Theodore Herzl.
A magistrate, a writer and a journalist, Theodore Herzl, a native
of Budapest 9 belonged to the Venetian bourgeoisie.
education had been in a Christian school.
who was assimilated in Central Europe.

His secondary

He was the intellectual Jew

At the beginning of his career,

Herzl thought that assimilation was the best solution of the Jewish
Question.

Therefore, he advocated a general baptism of the Jewish

people a
The idea of a general baptism ia half serious and half joking.
I allow myself to say, that I do not want to be baptised. But will
someone give it to my son, Hans? We must baptise our children vhen
they are incapable of thinking and when they cannot approve of being
either for or against. We must find ourselves among the people.3
However, in 1894, while in Paris to report on the proceedings of
the Dreyfus trial for an Austrian newspaper, the unfortunate outcome of
this trial convinced Herzl of the contrary.
lpinsker, P. 10.
2
Ibid.
l.aerzl, Diaries, P. 27.

4Jargy, P. 18.

4 He emphatically stated two

14
years later, in his famous pamphlet _The J ewis~ate, tb.&t, nthe distinct nationality of the Jews cannot, would not, (an9} must not
disappear. "

1

The Jewish State was published on February 4, 1896, in Vienna and
gave Zionism its real politico-nationalistic character.

This new

insight shaped the whole character of the Zionist movement: "it gave to
the movement the neo-Rousseauism of a. 'return

t~

the land' ".

2

From the outset, Theodore Herzl had attached great importance to

the British Jews: "Those energetic Jews to whom I imparted m;y scheme in
London were the backbone of the "society of Jews" which was to supervise
the execution of the project.

The financial problems involved were to

be handled from London by the "Jewish Company" set up a.eoording to English law and under the protection of England.

Furthermore, the latter

would be concerned with the liquidation of the properties of those who
wished to emigrate, and with their re-settlement in the new country. 3
Regarding the form of government, Herzl had envisaged a. constitutiona.l monarchy or a republic of the aristocracy on the line of Plato's.
His Utopia. vas to be not only a. Jewish state but a model state as well.

4

With regard to the territory on which the new Erzeth Israel was to
be founded, Herzl, an ardent Pa.lestiniat, did not a.t least at this stage,
m.a.k.e Palestine the ultimate aim of their long pursuit.

He had some

~eodore Herzl, L'Etat Juif (Paris: Editions de Herne, 1969),
P. 15.
2

Koestler, P. 38.

3Alem, P. 65.

4aerzl, L'Eta.t Juif. P. 17.
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difficulty in convincing Ben-Gurion, whose policy vas 'Palestine or
nothing', that ato succeed in creating a Jewish nation a.nd to have it in
.
.
. 1 e. 1
. "· at the same tJ.m.e
Z
· J.on
vas lmpossJ.b

Hovever, Herzl vas soon to

shift his attention towards the Promised Land: "the unforgettable a.nd
historical country whose name alone would constitute a. rallying cry of
irresistible force." 2
In 1897 Herzl started a. weekly publication called Der Weld, which
became the organ of the Zionist movement.

In the course of the same

year, Herzl, whose doctrine had a profound effect on the Jewish circles
in Europe, held the first Zionist congress in Basle, Switzerland.

The

congress adopted a. resolution on the basis of the creation of a
"national home publicly recognized and legally secured in Palestine. " 3
Two

hundred delegates were assembled from all over Europe.

It was at

this congress tha.t the official birth of Zionism was proclaimed a.nd
Herzl elected a.s the first president.

Also, the foundation of a world

Zionist organization was laid dawn with the aim o:f': ''assuring to the
Jewish people a national home in Palestine guaranteed by International
Law. 114

In order to materialize his project, Herzl approached those

powers which had some innuence on the powerful Jewish communities such
as Tza.rist Russia and those which had actual control of the coveted
land: the government o:f' Constantinople. 5

~erzl, Diaries, P. 27.
2

-----' L'Eta.t Juit, P. 18.

3Jargy, P. 17.
4

Herzl, L'Etat Juif, P. 25.

5

La.cot..'toure, P. 8.
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Up to 1914, Great Britain a.lone among the leading powers shoved
some serious interest in Zionism, although, in the

1860s~

vhen French

prestige in the Levant vas at its height, it seemed as though France
might be disposed to do something for the Jews in Palestine.

Nothing

had come of thia 7 just as nothing had come of Herzl's approach to the
Kaiser in the late 1890s, when Germany, then doing her best to advertise
and assert herself in Pa.lestine, had played for a moment vi th the idea
of a Zionist movement under German patronage and protection.

1

Among

other important personalities whom Rerzl approached were the Grand Duke,
Frederic de :Bade, the Italian Monarch, Emanuel III, and Pope Pius X.
Having succeeded in interesting the Grand Duke of Baden, Herzl told him

that Zionism needed a protector and that Germe.n protection would be more
welcome than any other.

2

During the war of 1914-1918, it we.s to occur to both French and
Germans that the Zionists might be usetul. friends.

However, in the last

year of peace the Zionists were in disfavour both in Paris and in
Berlin.

The Zionist campaign against the use of German as a language of

instruction, side by side with Hebrew, in the Jewish educational systems
in Palestine had irritated the German Foreign Office and Zionism was
denounced in the German press as the tool of enemies of Germany. 3
Although Zionism's main strength was Eastern Europe, many of its most
prominent figures were German Jews or Russian Jews oriented towards
l

Alem, P. 61.

2

Dib, P.

3 Ibid.

7.
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Germany by residence in that country or by their education at German
universities. 1

The seat of the directorate of the Zionist Executive,

originally in Vienna., was moved in 1905 to Cologne and in l9ll to
Berlin.

.Ul this might have been expected to cause the movement to

gravitate into the German orbit.
the Zionist

organization~

2

As international tension increased,

did, in fact, come to be suspected, both in

England and France, of being a conscious instrument of' German policy.
But this was a misjudgement.

Up to the outbreak of' war there vas no

evidence after 1898 of any firendly relations between the Zionist
leaders and the German government or its representatives in Constantinople.3
Similarly, Paris was the headquarters of the West European
branches of the Chibboth Zion (Love of Zion) movement, which has an
important place in the early Zionist history.

The influences thus

radiating :from Paris might well have been expected to provide the French
government with assets which it could turn to its advantage.

4

!Ierzl paid a visit to the man who vas considered to be the founder
of anti-semitic policies in Russia, Vya.cheslav Plehve, the Interior
Minister, and succeeded in attracting his interest towards his project. 5
Most important of all his efforts were, indeed, his difficult, negotiations with Sultan Abdul Hamid II, vhich lasted two years.

1Dib, P. 7.
2

Alem, P. 62.

3Ibid.
4Dib, P. 8.
5Ibid., P. 3.

The Sultan
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of Turkey had been approached in the meantime, and there seemed some
chance of his granting a charter of occupation in Palestine to the newly
formed Zionist organization.

The Sultan himself had not been disin-

clined to dispose of Palestine in return for cash.
mous

However, the enor-

sum he had asked was bey-ond the Zionist means of attainment at that

period.

As the bargaining went on, the Sultan became aware of Moslem

opposition, which he did not expect, and his enthusium for the sale of
Palestine was in consequence diminished.

1

Although deeply disillusioned by this failure. Herzl was, nonetheless, not discouraged.

With a new wave of persecutions and the

Jewish exodus from Rumania., innumerable interventions on behalf of the
Zionist movement had taken place all over Europe.

2

For some time Herzl had toyed with the idea. of obtaining territorial concessions in Mozambique or in the Belgian Congo.

He parti-

cula.rly turned to Great Britain, in order to benefit from the ardent
support of Lord Nathaniel Mayer Rothschild, head of the English branch
of this family. 3 With this project in mind, Herzl contacted Joseph
Chamberlain, Secretary- of State for the Colonies, in 1902.

Not having

effective rights over Palestine, the British Government was ready to
consider favourably two concessions:

1) Cyprus, and 2) El-Arish in

Sinai. 4 The Cypriot solution was rejected by the Zionist Congress.
However, the offer of El-Arish seemed more attractive, because they felt

~ib, P. 8.
2

Sokolow, P. 66.
3Ibid.

4Alem, P. 62.

f'a.lthough it is not Palestine, it is at the gate of' Palestine. 11

1

In a.

letter to Lord Rothschild, who had shown some interest in his proposals,
Herzl suggested that the El-Arish scheme might appeal to the British
Government, since British inf'luence in the Eastern Mediterranean would
be strengthened by a "large-scale settlement of our people at a point
where Egyptian and Indo-Persian interests converge. "

2

On the other hand, Chamberlain wae genuinely concerned about the

position of' the Jews in Eastern Europe and anxious that Great Britain
should do something to help them.

But Herzl seems to have convinced him

that the El-Arish in Sinai had also certain attractions :f'rom a British
point of viev. 3 Hitherto, Chamberlain's interest in Zionism had been
chief'ly humanitarian;
British policy.

he nov saw in it some positive opportunities f'or

:By supporting Zionists, Brit&in could enlist the sympa-

thies of' World Jewry on her behalf.

She could also secure Jewish

capital and settlers for the development of' what was virtually British
territory.

4 Looking, moreover, to the tuture, a Jewish colony in Sin&i

might prove a usetul instrument f'or extending British influence in
Palestine proper. when the time came for the inevitable dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire. 5 Chamberlain, who must have had the imperial as
well as the humanitarian aspects of' the Jewish problem in mind, rea.lized
that the El-Arish scheme was a forlorn hope.
1sokolow, P. 66.
2

Jargy, P. 23.

3Alem, P. 67.

4Ibid.
5Ibid.

During an official visit
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1

to East Africa

in 1902~ soon after his meetings with Herzl, he

seriously thought that British East A:f'rica might be suitable for a
Jewish settlement under British auspice.

He put this suggestion to

Herzl upon his return in the Spring of 1903.

2

In the sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, Herzl proposed that an
enquiry commission be sent to Uganda.
the Zionist Congress.
of betrayal.

This created the first rift in

The Russian delegation walked out, with shouts

At the outset the East African episode left deep scars on

the Zionist movement and resulted in the resignation of Herzl from the
presidency of the movement. 3 The opponents of the Uganda project were
so violent that one student shot at Max Nardau, the publio orator of
the movement in Paris, who had supported Herzl' s proposition, shouting,
"death to the African Na.rdau. 114
The Uganda affair brought the organization to the verge of
splitting and also left another legacy - a re-affirmation of British
goodwill towards Zionism. 5

With gratitude to the British Government and

pride in the enhanced status of the Zionist organization were mingled
the doubts and miasiVings of those who saw in the proposal the beginning
1

LChe.mberlain vas not thinking of Uganda but of the East African
protectorate, soon to become the colony of Kenya. He must, however,
have erroneously mentioned Uganda to Herzl, because in Herzl's Diaries·
it is written Uganda and not East Africa.] {"cited by") J .M.lf. Jeffries,
Palestine: the Realit:r (London: Longmans: Green B. Company, 1939), P. 18.
2

Alem~

P. 67.

3Herzl, Diaries, P. 53.

4~~C!·
5Alem, P. 67.

of the end of Zionism as a movement dedicated to the creation of a home
for the Jewish people in Palestine: the connection between the Jews and
Palestine was the essence of the Zionist Creed. 1

A year later, on July 3, 1904, Herzl died prematurely at the age
of 44.

2

The East African episode ended in 1905.

Once again the British

Government had occasion to interest itself in Zionism, but this time in
a less friendly spirit.

When, af'ter the Turkish Revolution, the Young

Turks began to veer towards Germany, it was believed in British circles
in Constantinople that the Zionists were working with pro-German
elements among the Jews and crypto-Jews prominently associated with the
Committee of Union and Progress. 3 Reports to this effect which reached
London from Constantinople in 1910-1912 did the Zionists no good in
British eyes.

In some influential British circles the idea gained

ground that the Zionists were somehow linked with the Jews behind the
Turkish Revolution and with the forces interested in swinging Turkey
into the German orbit.

4

With the death of Theodore Herzl, the second of Joseph Chamberlain's efforts to help the Zionists ended.

They were

made

at

a

time

when the arrival in England ot considerable numbers of Jewish refUgees
had given rise to an agitation against alien immigrants and a demand
1

teonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Vallentine
Mitchell, 1961), P. 17.
2

Alem, P. 67.

3Jargy, P. 83.

4stein, P. 83.

that the influx be checked.

After an enquiry by a Royal Commission

on Alien Immigration, certain restrictions on the entry of aliens
were proposed in a Bill introduced by the Balfour Government in the
1
Spring of 1904.
Though Chamberlain was satisfied of its necessity,
he seems also to have felt that the Jews, who were thus to be denied
asylum in England, ought, if possible, to be offered compensation and
it looks as though this accounts, at least in part, for the East
2
African offer.
The Balfour Government's Alien Bill became law in
the summer of 1905. 3
To say the least, Theodore Herzl, that genuine visionary, received the exhalting revelation of hie success ••• "I have founded the
Jewish state in Basle.

I dare not say this in a loud voice, lest it

should evoke general laughter.

In five years, surely in fifty years,

- 4
all of you will admit Lwhat
I have just said/."
The Jewish State was proclaimed 50 years and 8 months after the
First Zionist Congress in Basle. 5
With reasonable accuracy, it can be stated that the birth of a
Jewish State did not seem f'easible to the contemporaries of Theodore
Herzl but the creation of a national home, either in Palestine of elsewhere, was a certainty.
1
2

This is why Theodore Herzl deserves to be

stein, P. 83.
Sokolow, P. 101.

3stein, P. 84.
4
Herzl, Diaries, P. 80.

called the Father of Modern Zionism.

1

Two factors contributed to the success of Herzl's project:

the

Russian pogroms pushed more immi,snmts towards Palestine at a time vhen
Herzl ns defending his theory in the Diaspora.

Thus, pogroms and their

consequenuas brought simultaneously to the fore the realism of Herzl's
project and its tragic necessity.

Furthermore, the First World War and

the collapse ot the Ottoman Empire almost miraculously offered Zionism
the possibility of realization.

2

Another prominent figure in the Zionist 'Who's Who', is Chaim
Weizma.nn.

He was born in Grod.no, Poland, in 1893;

he emigrated to

England in 1904 in order to complete his studies, and became a natu-

~alized British subject. 3 From his youth, Weizmann
Zionist;

had

been an active

by 1914, he had risen to a prominent position, though not to

a C()f!IDI8..nding place, in the Zionist movement •
With hi& 'Mephisto:phel.ian face and ••• sinister charm'
had an unerring instinct tor timing.

4 Weismann

He vas a political seismograph and

able to impart to others his mystical faith in the destiny of the Jewish
people and the significanoe of their survival.

During the War,

Weizmann's scientific achievements enabled him to influence the British
Government and render invaluable service to his people.
Weizmann was never under the illusion that Zionism could rely for
l

Alem, P. 68.

2

Ibid., P. 71.

3Jargy, P. 8o.

4J .M.N. Jeffries, Palestine& ..The .Real.itz (London:
Green

&

Company, 1939) ,

P':'"' 23.

Longmans,

its success on mystical aberrations.

Rather, it must rely on those

facts that could be shown to accord with British strategic and political
interests.

On October 10, 1914, he conveyed his feelings to Israel

Ze.ngwill:
:t<ly pla.ns are based naturally on one cardinal assumption - viz.
that the Allies will win. I have no doubt in n~ mind that Palestine
will fall within the sphere of England. Palestine is a natural
continuation of Egypt and the barrier separating the Suez Canal ••.
the Black Sea and any hostility which may come t'rom that side ••
it will be the Asiatic Belgium especially if developed by the Jews.
We, given more or less good conditions, could easily move a million
Jews into Palestine within the next :f'itty or sixty years, and
England would have an effective barrier and we would have a
country ••• 1

It would be well to note the pivotal idea of an identity between the
British interests and that or the Zionist aspiration.
Furthermore, Weizmann was a remarkable chemist.

He was nominated

Advisor to the Admiralty and Minister or Munitions at a moment when the
latter was run by Lloyd George.

liis discoveries in the field or explo-

si ves rendered the Allies an important assistance.

It is said that

Lloyd George had stated on several occasions that, "the acetone had
converted me to Zionism. •• 2
In another place Lloyd George writes:
When our difficulties labout aceton!7 were solved through Dr.
Weizmann' s genius, I said to him: "You have rendered great service
to the state, and I should like to ask th~ Prime Minister to recoml'JleDd you to his Majesty for some honour."
To this Weizma.nn replied that he wanted nothing for himself but he would
1

cha.im Weizma.nn, Trial and Error (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1949),

P. 112.
2

Alem, P. 35.
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like something to be done tor his people.

He then vent on to explain

his aspirations tor the repatriation of the Jewish people in Palestine.

1

It seems that it vas the fount and origin of the famous Balfour
Declaration, which had consecrated the Jewish national home in
Palestine.

2

'Arise ye Arabs and Awake' • 3-In the 19th century, the Arab world
passed through a phase of profound evolution, arising trom a conflict
between nostalgia tor a glorious past and impatience to get rid of the
Ottoman domination, which vas the source of economic, social and political decadence, on the one hand, and the inTasion of Western ideas,
particularly these of the french Revolution, on the other.

The conver-

gence of these elements developed into an extremely explosive
nationalism.

4

Long before the conflagration of 1914, and u

a reaction against

the Pantouranism5 of the Arab Provinces preached by the Lords ot
Istanbul, the formation of diverse political groupe vas constituted;
sometim.ea they were under cultural or social labels but o:rten, too, with
clear political ideology.

6

1 Lloyd George, North Wales Chronicle, August 27, 1927.
2

Alem, P. 36.

\ajib Azoury. Le R6veil de la nation arabe {Paris: Plon, 1905),
P. 4.

4Dib, P. 5.
5During the 20th century, a nationalist movement in Turkey called
by' regrouping of all the TurkoMongol elements of Turkey, Iran and the USSR within one single state,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., Vol. VIII.

tor the creation ot a Touranian state

6Ja.rgy' p. 38.
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The leaders of such groups were convinced liberals in the Gladstonian fashion, deeply attached to the lofty principles of liberty,
eq,uality and national sovereignty.

They proclaimed the right of :peoples

to dispose of themselves and dreamed of a democracy based on social
justice and highlighted with Arab traditions.

1

The story of the Arab national movement takes place in Syria in

1847, with the foundation in Beirut of a literary society under American
patronage.

2

The two prominent figures of this movement were Nasif

Yaziji and Butrus Bostani, both Christian Arabs of the Lebanon. 3
In 1860, Bust ani founded a newspaper in Beirut called the Clarion
of pia, a name sufficiently explanatory of its mission.
first political journal ever published in the country.

It was the

In 1870, he

founded Al-Jenan LThe Garden!?, a fortnightly political and literary

.
renew.

4 He gave J.. t

as a mott o:

"Patriotism is an article of faithn;

a sentiment hitherto unknown in the Arab world. 5
In the early days of their association with the American Mission,
Ya.ziji and :Sustani had come forward with a proposal for the foundation
of a learned society.

The project matured in January 1857, when a

society came into being in Beirut, under the name of 'The Syrian Sci entific Society', which was to elaborate the first coherent Arab political

~ib, P. 5.
2Jeftries, P. 23.
3Ibid.

4Th~·
5Jeffries, P. 23.
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program.

1

An

their motive;

interest in the progress of the country as a unit was
a pride in the Arab heritage their league.

Thus, with

the founding of this society, the first explicit manifestation of a
2
•
.
•
collect1ve
nat•10nal consc1ousness
was vo1ced.

One of the members, Ibrahim Yaziji, a son of the great Nasif
Yaziji, had composed a poem in the form of an ode to patriotism:

Arise

ye Arabs and Awake. 3 The substance of this poem was an explicit
incitement to Arab insurgence.
Marseillaise of Arabism.

His poem was rightly labelled the

4

It would be well to note that at this point Arab national consciousness was only in its embryonic stage and independence was not the
preoccupation of the 'Syrian Scientific Society'.
to achieve some measures of liberalization.

Rather, the aim was

However, this moderation

was soon to find its radical manifestations in the demands of Najib
Azoury, a Palestinian, vho founded in 1904 the 'League of Arab Country',
in Paris.

He defined his revolutionary program for the liberation of

the Arab countries in a book entitled, The Awakening of the Arab Nation, 5
published a year later in Paris.

This is the first outward pronounce-

ment of radical demands for the constitution of' an Arab empire extending
from. the Tigris and the Euphrates across the Mediterranean Sea, and f'rom
1Jeffries, P. 25.
2

Ibid.

3Azoury, P. 4 •

4
Alem, P. 71.
5Azoury, P.
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the Persian Gulf to the Sinai.
the grounds that

11

1

Egypt vas excluded from these limits on

the inhabitants did not belong to the Arab race. tt 2

Azoury' s Arab empire comprised the Arab Peninsula, Iraq a.nd (its twin
sister) historical Syria, including Pe.lestine. 3 His project was unanimously accepted by all :f'uture Arab nationalists.

It marked e. turning

point in the Arab national movement since the Arab nation was given a

. . 4
• a1 de r·1n1t1on.
geograph 1c
Ironically. a 'National Committee' was founded in Paris by
Mustapha Pasha Kamel, an Egyptian, who issued a very important document
in 1895. 5
dence, "

6

It vas, in fact, a

11

prospective charter of the Arab indepen-

which was never to be lost f'rom sight and vas to re-emerge

twenty years later under the pen of Sherif Hussein, in Mecca.
Arab national consciousness which was borne on the wings of a
renascent literature, in its second phase of conception vas characterized
by e. shirt :from a principal.l.y cultural activity to a political movement. 7

A group of young thinkers began an agitation for the liberation of
their country from Turkish rule.

They were the pupils of Yaziji and

Busta.ni and were the first generation to have been reared on the
1

Azoury, P. 10.

2

Ibid.

3Ibid., P.
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4Ibid.

5Jeff'ries, P. 25.
6Ibid. t p. 27.

7nem, P. 74.

29
rediscovery of their cultural inheritance.

The seed of nationalism was

sown and a movement was coming into existence, whose inspiration was
purely Arab and whose ideal was wholly national. 1
It began with the seizure of power by the Young Turks in 1908 and
lasted until the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany.
The Young Turks, by adopting the liberal program of the 'Committee of
the Union and Progress' founded in 1894, had rallied the support of all
non-Turkish subjects of the Empire and had instilled great enthusiasm.

2

For example, a number of notable leaders of the minority groups had been
admitted to the new parliament and it was hoped that some profound
reforms would be enacted.

However, much to the disappointment of the

Arab subjects, the parliament hurriedly reopened a new page of Pantouranism.

Instead of putting into effect the promised decentralization, it

introduced measures of Turkanization in all the Arab Provinces. 3
The Young TUrks 1 racial enthtUJiasm carried them even further, to
the re-establishment of a Pre-Islamic Touranian civilization, at the
risk of crushing the very pillars of the Moslem Empire.

Consequently,

the new oppressive measures towards the Arab subjects, aggravated by
the deception of the hopes of 1908, embittered the Arabs and accelerated
the birth of the nationalist movement.

4

While the menace of war vas tmminent and Turkish participation a
fact, Arab nationalism entered its third phase of existence.
1

Jargy, P. 23.

2
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of

~oderate

reforms, of autonomy and of bi-partisanship were transformed

at this stage into concrete demands for liberty.

Thus the policies of

the 'Societies' were moved from the plane of political vengeance to
.....

.

suuvers~ve

ac t•~V1•t•~es. 1

In the post-Young Turks era, Arab national societies went under-

ground.

'Hizb-Al-Ahd' (Party of the Oath) was perhaps the most powerful

and dangerous of &ll such societies because its members were all high
ranking officers of the Ottoman a.rmies.

2

The secret or semi-secret

'Societies' which worked for Arab independence, or, as a first step, for
Arab

autono~, had grown

powerful.

The 'Al-Arabiya.h a.l-Fata.h' (Arab

Youth), wa.s founded in Paris, by Palestinians, one of whom became well
known later on as Auni Bey Abd-el Hadi, a signatory of the Versailles

Treaty. 3
For some time now. Sherif' Hussein of' Mecca, Governor of' the Holy
Places, had toyed with the idea of recreating the great Arab empire.
with himself as the Caliph.

He was following the political developments

with keen interest, in case the opportunity should arise for the realiza.tion of his objectives.

Exactly eight months before the outbreak of

the war, this intelligent Prince had instructed his eldest son, Amir
Abdullah, to contact Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner in
Cairo, to find out whether Britain would support the Ara.b cause for
independence tor Arab support of the Allies.
l

Jeffries, P. 27.
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CHAPl'ER II

PALESTINE:

THE THRICE 'PROMISED LA.TID'

The Dismemberment or the Ottoman Empire
The First World War puts in its proper perspective the personages,
the :f':ramework and the mishaps of the Palestine drama.

The play

ot the

great powers, espeeially' Great Britain, either excited or pacified the
hopes and ambitiona or the tvo movements, :making the two proscribed and
humiliated groups the greedy heirs of the Palestine conrlict.
Until

now~

1

both Zionism and Arab renaissance were kept under the

shadows of a decaying colonia.lism:

the Ottoman Empire.

Henceforth, the

tvo movements were to face the protective shield of a more competent
imperialism, that of the British Empire, whose ambitions had been
whetted by French competition in the Middle East.

2

Either for diplomatic or strategic reasons, four texts of prime
importance appeared between 1915 and 1918.

Forged by the pressures of

circumstance, dictated by the exigencies of time, these four texts are
the t'undamenta.l documents in the lexicon of Judeo-Arab conflict.
are the exchange of the McMahon-Russein letters (1915);

These

the Sykos-Picot

Agreement (1916);

the Balfour Declaration (1917); and the Declaration to

the Seven ( 1918}.

Each of these documents rill be treated briefly for

the sake of understanding the underlying causes of the present conflict.
1

2

La.coutoure, P. 10.
Ibid.
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The

Mci~on-Hussein

Correspondence.--The exchange of correspondence

took place between Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz, and Sir Henry
McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sud&n.

Sherif

Hussein was the most outstanding personality in the Arab world and one
of the stout exponents of the Arab cause.

The exchange of corres-

pondence could be summarised as a British promise of independence to the
Arabs, in exchange for Arab military support against Turkey.

This

promise included a restriction concerning the Syrian coastal area from
Damascus to Alexandretta: a precaution by the British authorities to
f'urther the aims of her a.lly, :France, regarding the Lebanon and Syria.
However, as ve see later the text of the McMahon Correspondence did not
exclude Palestine from the Arab boundaries proposed to the British
Government.

1

Indeed, the substantial threat of Turkey's entry into the war
against the allies on the one hand, and, on the other, the possible
effect of this upon the Moslem subjects of Great Britain and France, if
Turkey proclaimed a Jehad LHoly
greatest fear.

war7

constituted Great Britain's

Although the Moslems of India had gal.lantly responded to

the Empire' s call to arms against Germ.a.ny, a war against Turkey was a
tota.lly different matter.
saving point.

It vas, indeed, a crucial issue and Mecca the

It was, however, conjectured that, if the probable

Turkish proclamation of a Jeha.d remained confined to Turkey and did not
encompass the entire Moslem world, the danger point might pass;
only peril lay in a J@b§d supported by Mecca.
1 La.coutoure, P. ll.
2
Jargy, P. 21.
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On the wake of the First World War, the two sons of Sherif Hussein
of Mecca, Amir Abdullah and Amir Fay<;e.l, were in Istanbul as deputies
trom Jidda. and :Mecca respectively.

Amir Abdullah (later King of Jordan)

expressed his views on the impending war in his memoires:

"We saw that

the Turks hs.d shitted their position and, abandoning their friends, had
decided to side with the enemies of Russia. nl

It was felt then that

Turkey's motive was to go to war against the allies in order to divert
the attention ot all non-Turkish subjects away from the pressing demands
of decentralization.

2

On the other hand, the members of the 'Suriyya a.l-Fata.h' (the
Young Syria) Party had met in Damascus to organize a general revolt
against Turkey, in order to create a unified Arab nation encompassing
ua.ll

ot Syria from Tabuk (in the south), to the Vila.yets of' Aleppo and

Beirut (in the north);

and the governorate of' Jerusalem. n 3 Thus, the

preoccupations of' the British Empire and the aspirations of the Arab
peoples converged to pave the way for the famous McMa.hon-Hussein
Correspondence.

4

This negotiation launched a new phase of a rather obscure nature,
during which a. series of' promises were made by both the British
Government and Sherif' Hussein: Great Britain was concerned to win the

war and secure the life-line of communications to India.

Owing to an

~g Abdullah of' Jordan, !1ll4emoires Completed (Al-Takmila.)
(Washington: D.C.: American Council of' Learned Societies, 1954}, P. 32.
2
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ano:rnaJ.y of history, the Arabs occupied the region with the most strategic value, whose acquisition was considered vital to the British
interests.

On

the other hand:. the Arabs desired above a.ll the regaining

of their national independence from the oppressive regime of the
ottoman.

Hence the fate:f'ul Anglo-Arab negotiations, which consisted of

eight letters exchanged from July 14, 1915, to December 30, 1916. 1
In his first letter, the Sherif of Mecca presented the proposition
carefully formulated by the Arab nationalist societies, which reclaimed
the following frontiers:
Bounded on the north by Mersina.-Aderna up to the 37° of
latitude, on which degree falls Birijiks, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat,
.A:madia Islands, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the
borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the sou:th by the
Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain
as it is1 on the west by the Red Sea. the Mediterranean Sea up to
Mersina.~

It was stated, furthermore, as a second condition that the British
Government should approve and support the procla.mation of' an Arab Caliphate of Islam by Sherif Hussein.

The third condition stated that

"Peace was not to be concluded without the agreement of both parties. " 3
To this Sir Henry !kM&hon replied on October 1915:
Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence or the Arabs in a.ll regions within the limits demanded by
the Sherif or Mecca.
The Districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and nortions of
Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus: Roms, Home. and
AlepPQ cannot be said to be purelY .Arab and should be excluded from
the limits of the dominant provisions of the agreement. 4
1'J arg:r, P. 22.
2King Abdullah, P. 30.

3Ibid.

4Alem, P. 78.
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It woul.d be well to note that Palestine "lay not West, but South of the
reserved areas. nl
On

October 31 of the same year, Lord Kitchener cabled the following

message to .Amir Abdullah:
Germany has now bought the Turkish Government with gold, notwithstanding that England, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire it Turkey remained neutral to war. If the Arab
nation aaaiat England in this war, England v:ill cuarantee that no
intervention takes place in .Arabia and will give the Arabs every
assistance apinst external foreign acg.resaion. It 1118¥ be that an
Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and
so good come by the help of Ood out of the evil that now is
occurring.2

The significance ot this message lies in the tact that Kitchener' s cable
placed Sherif Hussein in the position ot the representative of the Whole
The negotiations with him becun on the assumption that

Arab world.

Britain meant negotiation with all the Arabs. 3 Consequently, and as the
resul.t of the assurances given by Lord Kitchener, Sherif Hussein conveyed
his otter of rewlt, provided his conditions based on the Damascus
Program (stated earlier) were met and respected by the British
Government.

A

letter to this ettect was sent in August 1916 to the

Britiah High Commissioner in Egypt.
as the Arab

This letter "fJJS.Y well be considered

!'fael:a Carta, since it laid the foundation of their

independence.

4

~e Arab Women' a Information COI'IIIId.ttee, "'!'he Facta about the
Palestine Problem," Vol. II, No. l (Januar;r 1969), P. 2.
2Great Britain, Colonial Ottice, Cmd. 5974 (London: 1939), "Report
of a committee set up to consider certain correapondence between Sir
Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, 11 P. 21.
3Jargy, P. 26.

4Jettries,

P. 63.
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On December 30, 1916, McMahon's letter reached Sherif Hussein with
the pressing message:
It is most essential that you should spare no efforts to
attach all the Arab people to our united cause and urge them to
afford no assistance to our enemies.
It is on the success ot these efforts and on the more active
measures which the Arabs may take hereafter in support of our cause,
when the time tor action comes • that the permanence and strength ot
our agx-eement must depend.l
The British Government's pledges were clearly and definitely phrased:
"Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence ot
the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries
proposed by the Sherif ot !4ecca."2
boundaries.

Palestine waa included in these

It vas on the basis ot these explicit pledges that the Arab

Revolt was launched.
The

~ltes-Picot

Agreement. -However, only three months after the

last letter in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, and after being
assured ot the Arab alliance, London turned to Paris, the other
'receiver' in the Levant.
The evidently secret agreement between Sir Marks Sykes and Mr.
George Picot amounted to no less than a scheme tor di Tiding the Levant

into spheres ot intluence. 3 The Foreign Ottice had instructed Sir Marks
Sykes to diacuss with Mr. George Picot, who was on a mission to Egypt, a
plan tor the "definition and delimitation ot French and British

1Jettriea, P. 83.
2

Ibid., P. 38.

~ric Rouleau, Israel et lea Ara'bes, le 3e Combat, P. 11.
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interests in the Turkish Near East. nl
Mr. George Picot signed the French agreement on December 21, 1916,

along the lines of McMahon's reservations:

"The French would administer

the coastal area, while Arab government of the four towns of Homs, Homa,
Damascus and .Aleppo would be under French influence."

2

Throwing light on yet another aspect of the Sykes-Picot agreement,
Lord .Aaquith states in his Diaries that Lloyd George was extra prudent
in his attempts "to prevent Palestine tal.ling into the hands of the
French atheiata." 3
The Balfour Decl&ration.--British political ambitions sought yet a
third alliance through the publication of the famous Balfour Declaration.
On

November 2, 1917, in a. letter addressed to Lord Walter Rothschild,

Sir Arthur Balfour conveys the following message:

1

Jeffries, P. 26.

2

Ibid.

3Lacoutoure, P. 12.

4

Stein, P. 15.

4

Foreign O:f'tiee,
November 2nd 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much plea.aure in eonve;ring to ;rou, on
behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following deele.:ration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which

has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
"His Majest;r's Government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine ot a national home tor the
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
ta.cilitate the achievement or this obj eet, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done vhieh may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and
politica.l. status enjoy"ed by Java in any other countr;r"
I should be gratefUl it you would bring this
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours
Signed: Arthur James Bal.four1

l I - The exact faesimile of the origina.l. letter reproduced trom

Leonard-steins' The Balfour Declaration

_7
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The text of this letter vas subsequently incorporated in the San
Remo Agreement and later in the 95th Article of the stillborn Treaty of
It was also recited in substantially the same terms in the

s~vres.

Mandate for Palestine as approved by the Council of the League of
Nations in July 1922. 1
In the Balfour Declaration u Arthur Koestler has it, a simple
transaction ot land took place, where "one nation
second, the count1'7 of a third. "

sol~

promised to a

2

There have been many conjectures as to the motives behind this
extraordinary piece of political maater;r.

It would be more plausible to

examine the testimony of one ot the co-authors, Lloyd George, concerning
"this all time improbable political document. u 3
In the evidence he gave before us, Mr. Lloyd George, who vas
Prime Minister at that time, stated that, while the Zionist cause
had been widely supported in Britain and America before November
1917, the launching ot the Balfour Declaration at that time vas 'due
to propag&Rdist reasons' i and he outlined the serious position in
which the Allied and Associated Powers then were. The Rumanians had
been crushed. The Russian &l'JV vas demoralized. The French a.rnor
vas unable at the moment to take the ottensive on a large scale.
The Italians had sustained a great defeat at Caporetto. l.U.llions ot
tons ot British shipping had been sunk by German submarines. No
American di"f'isions were yet available in the trenches. In this
critical situation it wu believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would ll&ke a substantial difference one way or the other to
the Allied cause. In particular Jewish sympathy would confirm the
support ot the .American Jewry, and would :make it more ditticult for
Gel':lll8.D)" to reduce her milit~ commitments and improve her economic
position on the Easter tront.
1

llem, P. 85.

~estler, P. 4.
3zbid.

4Great Britain, Palestine Rof!:l Commission Report (London: His
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1937), P. 17.

From the beginning of the war, American Zionists and the British
Government could envisage the consequences of an eventual dismemberment
of the ottoman Empire.

1

The possibility or taking a mortgage in Pales-

tine had also 'been studied.

Louis Brandeis, Chief Justice or the

u.s.

Supreme Court and an ardent Zionist , could not take an open part in
tavour of a Jewish establishment in Palestine, especi&l.ly when his
country was not at war vith Turkey.

2

But, by virtue of his high position

and his personal. friendship, he could persuade President Wilson to convey
to the British Government the satisfaction that such an attribution would
bring to American Jewry.

The weight of this communication over British

decision can hardly be over-estimated. 3
Another factor in the creation ot this declaration, as mentioned
elsewhere, vas British apprehension of aD7 French establishment in
Palestine.

The French, being convinced ot having an historical right

over the region, had expressed a desire to obtain a mandate over
Palestine.

4 The English, on the other hand, would not, at any price,

allow French installation along the Suez Canal, facing the Egyptian bulwark situated along the rout:e to India.

Sir Herbert Samuel had expressed

this apprehension in a Cabinet meeting in March 1915:

"The establishment

ot a ueat European power so close to the Suez Canal vill be a permanent
and formidable menace to the linea ot cOIDJIWlioations so vital to the
1

Alem, P. 11.
2
Ibid.
3Ibid. t P. 18.

4Jargy, P.
30.
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Empire."

1

This view vas confirmed by Sir Marks Sykes, who pointed out in a
speech on March 18 that French activities in Syria revealed a disguised
threat to vital British interests, since "the policy of the French
financiers would eventually destroy the Ottoman Empire," 2 and the
British Government would confront a "European frontier in the Sinai
peninsula." 3

A third factor in the successfUl launching of the Balfour Declara.tion was the Russian Revolution or 1917.

The Bolshevik Government

welcomed the idea of a Jewish settlement in Palestine, and endorsed the
Balfour Declaration.

It had hoped, that a socialistic Jewish nation

along the Soviet line might eventually be formed in the Middle East.
However important the elements, it is not any less significant that
the successful endorsement or this unique document may be attributed to
the romantically sentimental outlook of its co-authors:

Lloyd George,

Lord Balfour, and General Smuts's .tX>(:jtical inspiration created a political document in the Old Testamentarian mould:

"to assume in one
4
glorious moment, the role of messianic Providence. "
The

wording of this document .is even more contusing than the

motives which caused such unprecedented meddling.
says:

The Royal Commission

"It is clear to us that the words 'the establishment in Palestine

or a National Home' were the outcome of a compromise between those
--~--·------·-··-·------

l

Alem, P. 77.

2

Stein, P. 49.

3Ibid.
4Koestler, P. 7.

ministers who contemplated the ultimate establ.iahment of a Jewish State
and those who did not. nl
General Smuts, a member of the Imperial War Cabinet, understood
the 'National Home' in quite a different

~:

" ••• in generations to
2
come a great J evish state rising there once more. " Winston Churchill' a

de:fini tion of this nege bl.a:nc is even more ambiguous:
When it is asked what is meant by the development of a Jewish
National Rome in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the
imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine
aa a whole, but the turther development of the existing Jewish
coJII!lnnity ••• in order that it may become a center in which the
Jewish people as a whole may take, on groundll of religion and race,
an interest and pride. 3
However, the Arabs were promised that nothing would be done in Palestine
to "prejudice their civil and religious rights. "

4

In the final anaJ.ysia, the Bal.fo\U' Declaration vas not received

without disdain in the capitala of ll'rance and Italy.

Their interest in

Palestine had already been recopized by the British Government.

French

interest had been secured under the Sykes-Picot agreement and the
Italians were given the assurances contained in the ·Conference of St.
Jean de Ma.urrienne. 5 Furthermore, both the French and the Italians had
been at war with Turkey;

France from the start of the hostilities and

Italy at a later stage, when it became a party to the secret treaties on
1

Great l3ri.tain, Palestine Royal Commission, P. 18.

2zbid.

3Ibid." P. 24.
4
Koestler, P. 10.

5Stein, P. 54.

the dismemberment or the ottoman Empire.
On

1

the other hand, the United States was not at war with Turkey,

and the eventual oo1lapse or the Ottoman Empire did not constitute her
major concern.

It was this ver:r lack or interest in the eventual

dismemberment ot the ottoman Empire that created an obstacle to an
American endorsement or the Balfour Declaration.

The American Secretary

ot state, Robert Lansing, in a letter to President Wilson on December 13,
1917, urged the President "to resist the pressure ot the American
Zioniste tor a public expression ot American approval. "

2

He reminded the

President that:
We are not at war vi th Twritey, and therefore should avoid a.ny
appearance ot taking terri tory from that &rxpire by force. Second,
the Jews are by no means a unit in the desire to re-eatab1ish their
race as an independent people ••• Third, ID.&llY Christian sects and
individual.a would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to
the absolute control ot the race credited with the death of Christ.
For practical purpoaes, I do not think tb.a.t we need go :fUrther than
the tirst reason given, since that is ample ground for declining to
announce any policy in regard to the tiDal disposition of Palestine. 3
Shortly atter this communication, however, President Wilson vas
induced by Chief Justice Brandeis to endorse the Declaration.

4

The Declaration to the Seven.--Thia document is the moat important
and the least k.nOVll statement of policy made by Great Britain regarding
the .Arab Revolt.

It is in fact a re-attirmation ot Great Britain's pre-

vioua pledges to the Arabs, based on an authoritative enunciation of the
1

a.ein, P. 78.

2

Jef'tries, P. 80.

3Ibid.
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principles on which those pledges rested. 1
In short, the statement defined British policy for the tuture of'
the regions claimed by Sherif' Hussein as the area of legitimate Arab
independence.

With regard to Syria, Iraq a.nd Palestine, the Declaration

contained two important assura.nces:
1)

that Great Britain would continue to work. not only

tor the liberation of' those countries tram Turkish
oppression but also tor their independence;
2)

that Great Britain would ensure that no system of
government would be set up in the countries involved
2
that was unacceptable to the inhabitants.

The Declaration to the Seven, made public to the Arab representativee on June 16, 1918, by the Foreign Office, had a decisive ef'tect
in dispelling the doubts and apprehensions aroused by previous agreementa. 3

(See Appendix for turther detail on the Declaration to the

Seven).

l

:Alem, P. 79.

2nid.

3Ibid.

CHAPTER III
HIGH HOPES AND DISILLUSIONMENT
The Versailles Peace Treaty.--With Turkey's signing or the armistice on October 28, 1919, at Uoudros, all of the former territories of
the Ottoman Empire were liberated.
Jews alike.

Immense hopes had stirred Arabs and

They had been victorious in their battles and they were

awaiting the rewards of their saeririees.
the most trying moment in her history:

However, for Britain, it was

at this hour of truth, the

British Government was confronted with the task of fUlfilling its contradictory promises of the Holy Land to both Zionism and Arab nationalism. 1
The tuture destiny of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire was inscribed on April 25, 1919, in Article 22 of the League of
Nations.

It was the darkest moment in the millenary history of the

Levant, for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state was guaranteed by the Great Powers. 2
Turkey's defeated territory was exactly the area desired by the
Arabs and its boundaries coincided with the natural limits of Arab
independence defined by Sherif Hussein.

However, contrary to the promise

made and the principles upheld by the Allies as the basis for future
peace, Great Britain and France did not hesitate to impose a settlement
upon the Arabs. 3 Thus, upon his arrival in Paris in January 1919, as the
l

Alem, P. 100.

2

Jargy, P. 38.

3Jeffries, P. 88.

spokesman of the Hedja.z delegation, Amir

Fay~a.l

was confronted with

three forces working against the fulfilment of Arab aspirations:
(1) British interests in Iraq and Palestine,

(2) French imperial

interests in Syria, (3) Zionists' national interest in Palestine.
Instructed by his father, Amir

Fa.y~al

1

claimed, in recognition of

their services, the independence of the area promised by McMahon:
from the line of' Alexandretta-Diarbl!kir to the Indian Ocean. "

...

2

On the other hand, headed by Chaim Weizmann, as the English representati ve, and Rabbi Wise as the American spokesman of' Zionism. the
Zionist delegation claimed the following:
l) Recognition of' the historical title of the Jewish people
over Palestine.
2) Definition of the frontiers of' Palestine from the River
Litani in the north circumscribing the basin of Jordan and a part
or Yarmouk, Hernon and Houran; in the east, all along the BagdadHedjaz railway; and the Gulf' or Aqaba in the south.
3)

Great Bri t&in e.s the mandatory power over Palestine.

4) The adoption or a political, economic and administrative
clause to assure the establishment of' a Jewish National Rome and to
make the eventual creation of' an autonomous state possible.3
There was yet another battle being waged between Great Britain and
France over the execution ot the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
Bolshevik Revolution, Russia denounced this agreement.

Arter the
Lloyd George, the

other signatory to the .Agreement. was inclined to follow suit, for two
reasons:

(l)

under the Agreement the Vila.yet of Mosul. with its rich

~alter La.queur, The Road to Jerusalem: the Ori ins of' the ArabIsraeli Conflict 126I (New York: The MacMillan Company, 19
, P. 20.
2

.Alem, P. 104.

3~., P. 106.
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oil fields, was assigned to France, (2) Palestine wa.s to be under an
international regime;

this would have gravely hindered Great Britain

from having a free hand in Palestine.

1

However, France rejected the annulment of the Agreement.

As a

result, Lloyd George, upon Clemenceau's insistence proposed that, in
return for ceding Mosul and Palestine to Great Britain, France should
have a guid pro quo
:f'rom Mosul.

compensation~

including substantial oil concessions

2

T)le Weizmann-Fe.ygal Accord.-The controversial accord to which so
much importance has been attributed was, in fact, no more than a hospitable gesture on the part of Amir

F~Qal

toward the Jewish people.

Furthermore, in 1919, there was as yet no question of an independent
'Jewish state' being created in Palestine but simply the creation of a
few Jewish colonies and the acceptance of a certain number of Jews who
would be allowed to live peacetu.lly in Palestine.

Amir FayQal ws.s per-

suaded by Lawrence to sign the treaty in January 1919;
a treaty of friendship between Arabs and Jews.

However,

this amounted to
F~Qal

appended

a significant statement in Arabic:
If the Arabs obtain their independence according to the conditions spelled out in my diary on January 4, 1919, addressed to the
British Foreign Secretary, I will give effect to the substance of
this accord. In the case of the slightest modifications, I will no
longer be 'bound by a single word. The accord will not be valid and
will be nullified, and I will not be responsible for any engagements.3
The King=Crane Commission.--An independent American mission carried
1

Jeffries, P. 89.

2

Alem, P. 114.

3Jargy, P.
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out by Dr. Henry King and Charles Crane began an investigation in June

1919 in Jaffa, which took them to all parts of Syria, including Palestine.

The investigation lasted for six weeks and the commissioners

presented their findings on June 28, in Paris. 1
The King-Crane Report is an outstanding document vi th regard to
the Palestine conflict.

The commissioners recommended a mandatory

system for Syria-Palestine and Iraq, on condition that the mandate be

tor a limited period and that the mandatory should aim at bringing the
territories to independent status;
Palestine, be preserved;

that the unity of Syria, including

that &.constitutional monarchy for Syria, with

Amir FS\Y<;al as king, be proclaimed;

and that another Arab sovereign be

chosen. by plebiscite, to rule over Iraq.

2

Concerning the choice of mandate, the Report indicated that the
consensus of opinion in Syria was in favour of assistance by the United
States or Great Britain but not

by

France.

With regard to Zionism, the

King-Crane Commission felt bound to recommend that the Zionist program
should be greatly reduced, Jewish immigration definitely limited and the
very idea of making Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth abandoned, since
they were convinced that the Zionists looked forward to a practically
complete dialodging of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. 3 They
further stated that, even if it were achieved within the form of law, it
would be a gross violation of the rights of the people and the principles
1
2

Alem, P. 115.
Ibid.

3Ibid.

proclaimed by the Allies. 1
Despite this candid a.nd f'orcef'ul statement, the King-Crane recommendation was ear-marked f'or oblivion;

and Great Britain and France

imposed a 'settlement' of' their own choice over the Arab countries.
The San Remo Conf'erence.--on 25th April, 1919, the Supreme Council
met at San Remo.

Decisions regarding the former territories of' the

Ottoman Empire were taken, to the ef'f'ect that the entire area lying
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian frontier was to be placed
under mandatory rule. 2 Syria was to be broken up into three parts:
Palestine, the Lebanon and, of' what was left, a reduced 'Syria' • They
were disposed so as to suit the ambitions of' each of' the mandatory
Powers. 3 These decisions were made public on~~ 5th and their promulgation gave birth to a new sentiment in the Arab world:
Western Powers.

contempt f'or

4 Moreover, it was the starting point of' a new chapter in

the history of' the Arab Movement - insurgence against the powers of' the
West. 5
As later developments proved, poli tica.lly, the decisions were

unwise in that they ran counter to the deepest wishes of' the people concerned and to a tide of' national consciousness which the war and the
defeat of' the Turks had swelled to a level from which there could be no

~avid Hunter Miller, .
Longma.ns, Green and Company 1
2
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receding.

On the moral plane. they stand out as one of the more

flagrant instances of international diplomacy, in which the breach of
faith was all the more reprehensible in that it provoked armed resistance and an unpredictable toll of human life and suffering.

In

addition, it violated the very principles, regarding the treatment of
weaker nations • that the mandates were originally created to serve.

~iller, P. 116.

1

CHAPI'ER IV

PALESTINE UNDER 'PAX BRITANNICA'

The basic principle of the British Mandate over Palestine vas
determined during the Conference at San Remo on April 20, 1920.
t~date

This

imposed on Britain the general obligations toward the Arabs

dictated by the League of Nations.

On

the other hand, Britain's specific

obligations toward the Jews were dictated by the promise of' the Balfour
Declaration.

This is the reason f'or the continuation in the Levant of

contradictory engagements by the West. 1
On September 29, 1923, the British Mandate came formally into

effect.

Article 2 o:f the Covenant laid down that:

The Mandatary shall be responsible :for placing the country
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down
in the preamble, and the development o:f self-governing institutions
and also :for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the
inhabitants o:f Palestine, irrespective o:f race or religion.2
The Mandate "showed complete disregard for the 90 per cent Arab
majority in Palestine b.y referring no less than :fourteen times to the
Jews or Jewish institutions, whereas the Arabs were never mentioned. " 3
Thus, the progress of' Zionist colonization during the Mandate became for
the Arab national outlook a culminating stroke in a prolonged series of'
breaches of :faith.
1
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The growing Arab opposition to the Mandate and the ensuing riots of
1920 and 1921 resulted in a British Government White Paper.

In June 1922,

winston Churchill, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued a
policy statement, or White Paper, stating that:
While it reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, he announced that
the British Government had no intention that Palestine should become
'as Jewish as England is English' ; that it did not contemplate the
subordination of the Arab population, language or culture~ that
immigration would not exceed the economic absorptive capacity of the
country, and that the special position of the Zionist Executive did
not entitle it to share to any degree in the government of the
country.l
Despite the above statement, in the few years which covered the
tenure of office of Sir Herbert Samuel, Lord Plumer, Sir John Chancellor,
Sir Arthur Wauchope and Sir Harold MacMichael, the Jews. who in 1921 did
not number more than 100,000, increased to 450,000.

They had acquired

control of most of' the fertile plain, as well as the uncultivated land
from Beer Sheba to Lake Hulah.

2

In 1937, the Royal Commission, after making a thorough assessment
of the situation. re&l.ized that the Mandate vas unworkable.
that partition was the only

way

It concluded

out of the impasse which, "if it offers

neither party all it wants, offers each what it wants most, namely
freedom and security ••• and the inestimable boon of peace. " 3 In other
words, partition meant "that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion
from their sovereignty of a piece of territory long occupied and once

1
Great Britain, Palestine R al Commission Re ort, Cmd. 5479
(London: His ~~jesty's Stationary Office, 1937 , P. 200.

~avies, P. 40.
3Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission, Cmd. 5479, P. 206.
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.,1

ruled by them. ·

Moreover, in 1937 the Peel Commission "recognized the British promises to Arabs and Jews as irreconcilable and the

~Andate

as unworkable;

2

it defined as the objective the establishment of a Jewish state and an

Arab state, through partition.

The British Government endorsed the Royal

Commission's findings and appointed a fUrther commission to work on the
details of a partition plan.

However, this commission, finding the

country in the throes of an open Arab rebellion, reported that no practicable plan of partition could be worked out. 3
In 1939, the White Paper known as the McDonald Memorandum stated
that the objective of the British Government was the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state within ten years.

The White Paper categori-

cally stated that nHis Majesty's Government now declares unequivocal.l:y
that it is not part of its policy that Palestine should become part of
the Jewish state."
up

by

4 The Jewish reaction to the White Paper can be summed

David Ben-Gurion:

''We shall tight with Great Britain in this war as

it there were no White Paper. And we shall tight the White Paper as if
there were no war."5
In the final analysis, in the words o:f' Arthur Koestler,
What both Jews and Arabs believed to be a 'diabolic policy' was
in fact the traditional muddling-along policy, guided by some vague
1
2

Great Britain, Palestine Rozal Commission, Cmd. 5479, P. 215.
Ibid.

3Ibid.
4
Davies, P. 30.

5navid Ben-Gurion, Israel, ann~es de lutte (Paris: Falnunarion,

1954), p. 103.

,-l
)L.,

notions of balancing the power of Arabs and Jews, and maintaining as
far as possible the status quo. But the whole point of the .Balfour
Declaration was to upstt the balance by transforming Arab Palestine
into a Jewish country.
In April 1947 Britain at last capitulated and na.sked that the
question of the Mandate should be placed on the agenda of the next
regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. "

2

The British had declared their intention of leaving Palestine by
May

15, 1948.

On

that day the Mandate would end and juridically there

would be a vacuum, since, as a preliminary to the establishment of the
successor states, Britain retused to share responsibility with the
United Nations during the Mandate.
Erskine Childers has thus summed up the British policy in Palestine:
Forcibly to detach a people from their historic kinsfolk
(Palestinians thought of themselves as part of Arab Syria), solemnly
to declare that this detachment was in order to raise them to selfdetermination, yet forcibly to impose upon them an alien community
seeking to make their land 'as Jewish as England is Engll,h' this was
and is without precedent or parallel in the twentieth century.
Nowhere in colonial Asia was anything so provocative attempted.
Palestine was to become a. cancer unique in Western-nationalist eonniets.3
The Partition Plan.--On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of
the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine into two
a Jewish and an Arab state, with the possibility of an economic

states:
union.

4
lxoester, P. 17.
2

Alem~

P. 170.

~rskine Childers, The Road to Suez (London: McGibbon and Kee,
1962), P. 65.
4
Alem, P. 170.
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The details of the voting process are well known;

the United

Nations Partition Plan came about by virtue of the votes of the Client
States who, under the pressure put by the Zionists and Zionist sympathisers of the United States, were obliged to vote for this plan.

l

It

would be well to look at some reflections on the outcome of the vote.
The Canadian delegation admitted:
and worried heart";

2

'lWe choose the partition with a heavy

the Belgian Foreign Minister hesitantly stated:

nwe are not sure that this solution is altogether just • • • we are not
even sure if it is practicable ••• but what other choice can we make?
is this solution, or none at all.. ''

It

3

Nonetheless, the United Nations partition recommendation o:f 1947
heralded the cataclysm.

The decision had given the Zionists, who held

less than seven per cent of Palestine, about :fitty-five per cent of the
country.

4 Moreover, the United Nations decision wa.s a revolutionary one

designed to effect a radical redistribution in :favour of the Zionists.
To succeed, the Zionists had to revolutionize the status quo;

and action,

initiative as well as armed attack were therefore the sine qua

~

tor

the realization of the Zionist objectives. 5
For the Arabs, as well as for the rest of the Asian countries • the
United Nations' decision took on the sense o:f a new 'crusade' by the

~deau, P. 68.
2

Cbilders~ P.

72.

3Ibid.

4

Jargy, P. 43.

5James G. McDonald, !1Y !IJ.ssion to Israel (!lew York: Simon and
Schuster, 1951), P. 145.

west, in imposing their wish on the Orient, despite their solemn affirmation regarding the right of self-determination of the people and their
.

t y. 1

sovere~gn

The

day

that Palestine was abandoned by the British fell on a

Saturday, May 15, 1948.

The Jewish authorities, in order to observe

their Sabbath proclaimed the State of Israel before sunset.

It was pro-

claimed at 16 hours and 15 minutes by Ben-Gurion, in the Tel Aviv Museum
where the ceremony was to take place, and the white and blue flag with
the star of David was raised.

For the Jews, this fatetul date ushered

in the proclamation of the State of Israel and for the Arabs, the pronouncement of war.
In the last analysis, the United Nations vote on the Partition of
Palestine "in part was dictated by anxiety to offer a ref'u.ge to the displaced people, created the further problem of the refugees and therefore
•
• •
•
n2
l ost a great part of ~•t s moral JUSt~f~cat~on.

The Aftermath.--The logical consequence of the proclamation of the
State of Israel in 1948 was a breaking out of the hostilities known as
the First Arab-Israeli War, during which many innocent lives were sacrificed and a minimum of "750,000 Arab refugees created." 3 Consequently,
the United Nations formed a new organ in order to deal with the problems
of the Palestinian refugees.
The Formation of the United Nations Emersenc1 Force.--In the early
spring of 1948, the Security Council took its first action on the

~cDonald, P. 90.
2

Alem, P. 197.

~he Economist, Vol. CCXXIV, No. 6462 (July, 1967), P. 20.

question of Palestine.

This action was prompted by the increasing

violence and political deterioration in the Middle East.

Faced with the

resulting difficulties, the Security Council adopted a Resolution (6147,
April 1948) calling for a cease-fire in Pa1estine. 1
The ensuing violence was dire.ctly connected with the General
Assembly's Partition Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181 (II),
29 November, 1947).

This called for the creation of a Jewish state and

an Arab state in Palestine: with economic union, and an international
administration for Jerusalem.

The plan was vehemently rejected by both

the Arab states and the Palestinians and violence broke out when the
Arab states resisted its implementation. 2
Meanwhile. the General Assembly, in its Second Special Session
(Resolution 186 ES-II), appointed a mediator, Count Folke Bernadette, to
cooperate with the Truce Commission in Palestine. 3 When hostilities
broke out between the Arab states and Israel, after the latter's proclamation of' the State of Israel on May 15, 1948) the Truce Commission asked
for militar.r assistance and advisers.

The Security Council, on

May

29,

1948, pursuant to achieving a cease-fire in the area, decided that the
UN mediator and the Truce Commission should jointly supervise the ceasefire.

From this action came into existence the United Truce Supervision

Organization (UNTSO), which stayed in operation in the Middle East for
lunited Nations, General Assembly, The United Nations Emergens:z
Force (A/3276, November 4, 1950), P. 3.
2Ibid.

~.L.14. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York:
Inc., 1963), P. 187.

Ivan Obolensky,

twenty years.

1

The General Assembly, on November 4, 1950, under the

terms of the "Uniting for Peace Resolution", adopted a resolution for a
plan for a United Nations Emergency Force;

the General Assembly:

Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to
submit within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the
consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international
United Nations Force, to secure and supervise the cessation o~
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned
(November 2) resolution.2
A brain-child of the Canadian delegation headed by Mr. L.B. Pearson,

the November 4 Resolution vas adopted with 57 votes in favour, 0 against,
and 19 abstentions, including the USSR; 3 and UNEF vas created.

1

Burns, P. 187.

~nited Nations, General Assembly~ The United Nations Emergency
Force, P. 3.
3Burns, P. 187.

CHA.P.rER V

ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRA..EL IN THE COLD WAR
The 'Palestine Conflict' Enters the International Scene.--In the
post-war era, the Middle East was looked upon exclusively as a strategic
and military area.

It seems that, to the West, at least, this region

constituted a continuation of the NATO defense system established in
Europe to guarantee Western :petrol, as vell as other economic interests,

against the Soviet Union.

Perhapa, it vas also designed to safeguard

the sovereignty of young emerging states against Communist infiltration.
But, unfortunately, true to the dictates of their tradition and customs,
the Western powers considered the Middle East a.s their exclusive fief,
and even as a private hunt.

1

'l'herefore, it is not surprising that the

Palestinian contlict i tselt vas trom the beginning, only a secondary
part of this global strategy.

The solution to the :problem of the

retugees, in a purely economic context, had to be conceived within the
framework of an organization for the common defense of the Middle East,
under the aua:pices of the West.
Post-war conditions had

2

alre~dy

defined and accentuated certain

profound rivalries and divergences between the three Western powers
interested in the Middle East.

The Anglo-Saxona made an effort to

eliminate France from the Eastern scene and Anglo-American economic
1
2

Jargy, P. 100.
Ibid., P. 99.
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competition virtually excluded any Soviet interest in the area.

But,

political flirtations on the part of some of' the major Arab countries
with the USSR rendered obsolete and soon ineffective the joint efforts
of' the Western powers in the Middle East. 1
Western rivalries existed parallel to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Anglo-American design was to include the Middle East in an antiSoviet defense system which would extend the Atlantic Pact.

The United

States, persuaded by Great Britain to assume responsibility in the
Middle East, in order to secure American and Western interests in the
area, established a security system to check the Soviet threat.

This

was the M.E.D.o. {Middle East Defense Organization) project which had
absorbed Western diplamaey since 1950.

2

The Baghdad Pact.--For a proper functioning of this project, it was
necessary to obtain the adherence of the Islamic countries in the Middle
East.

A first step was accomplished by the conclusion of the 1954 Turko-

Pakistani Pact.

The two ends of the Islamic world had rallied.

participation of the rest was of prime importance.

The

However, for Arab

countries to enter the Ankara-Karachi alliance, it was becoming imperative first to solve the Palestinian problem.
its place among the Arabs.

Israel, too, had to find

On the other hand, it was necessary that no

Arab state should be tempted to use against Israel, weapons delivered
by Western powers.

lio adherence meant no armament from the West. 3

Later developments seem to indicate that it was a psychologicaland

1Jargy, P. 99.
2Ibid.
3Ibid. ~ p. 100.

61
ta.etica.l mistake of the vleet to miscalculate the reactions of Arab
opinion, especially the belief that the Arab Oovernm.ents vould accede
confidentially to such an alliance, by-passing the Arab masses. 1
~.1emories

of Arab struggles against Western domination and the First

Arab-Israeli war vere too vivid to allow such historical and psychological factors to be ignored. 2 For the Arabs, Israel remained the
arch-enemy.

Coll11J1unism and the USSR, by comparison, were distant

threats 11 not to be heeded;

indeed, a. t\lnda.mental optical dif:fe1•ence

betveen the Occident and the Orient.
Egypt, as one of the principal Arab countries, remained opposed to
the plan.

On the other hand, Britain succeeded in persuading its

staunch ally, the Iraqi Prime

Minister~

Nouri Said, to announce in

February 1955 the adherence of his country to the Ankara-Karachi defense pact, christened henceforward, the Baghdad Pact. 3 For Egypt, the
Baghdad Pact was tantamount to a camouflage;
4
however, a. sheer provoc~tion.
France denounced this dea.l.

for the Soviet Union,

She warned the West of tbe dangers

involved in such a rash decision to put pressure on the Iraqi Government
to adhere to the Anglo-American defense system.

According to Paris,

public opinion in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the Arab world, vas not
prepared to accept the hurried entry of Arab countries into a Western
1

Ja.rgy~

P. 102.

2IbJA·
3_;r_pid. ' p. 103.

4Alem, P. 180.
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mi~itary paet on the side of Israe1. 1
The Soviet Entry in the

~.iddle

East. -The Soviet Union could no

longer remain a spectator in the face of this development:
creation of the Baghdad Pact.

namely, the

In the Soviets' view this pact had the

sole aim of undermining their security.

Andrei Gromyko had expressed

the :f'ear that, "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent in the :face
of the situation existing at present with

reb~d

to the creation

o:f'

the

above-mentioned b~ocs." 2 The establishment "of the military bases on
the territories o:f' the Near and

l~ddle

.East countries has an immediate

bearing on the security of the Soviet Union." 3
In the tense atmosphere created by the Baghdad Pact. and vi th
Palestine conflict still alive, the stand taken by the Soviet Union made
a profound impression on the Arab leaders and nationalists.

The outbreak

of the Arab-Israeli crisis waa soon to give Moscow the opiortunity o:f'
affirming its long-standing dreams of being present in the Near East.

4

The Nationalization of the Suez Canal Com;ea&.-The situation became
dangerously aggravated by the suspension of negotiations between Egypt and
the United States regarding the financing of the Aswan Dam.

To find the

necessary resources, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July
1956.5 The legal aspect of the nationalization of the Suez Canal falls
1
A.M. Goichon, "Lea
( 1964 ) , p. 78.

Mtugi~s Palestiniens,"

2

Jargy, P. 103.

3Ibid.

4
Ibid., P. 104.
5Roulea.u, 3e Combat, P. 115.
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beyond the sco1)e of' this study.
that

by

It is sufficient to

note~

however,

nationa.lizing the Suez Ce.na.l Company, Nasser created tremendous

complications.

On October 23, 1956, an Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack wa.s l.aunched
against Egypt. The Kremlin authorities 1 came to the rescue of Egypt,
however.

Shortly after that episode, the USSR was found again at the

side of Syria in a similarly friendly role.

As a consequence, the

successors of Peter the Great and Catherine II found themselves in the
Mediterranean region. 2
Over a long period of time, Great Britain had used every possible
means to prevent Russian access to the Bosphorus and the Dradanelles.
To this end, she had given support to the Sultan and, later to the
countries which had been emancipated from her suzerainty.

Furthermore,

in the Saa.dabad Pact she grouped together Turkey, Iraq, Iran and
Afghanistan, following this move by the Bagllda.d Pact

and

the

CENTO.

This traditional antagonism between the Maritime and the Continental

powers was always aimed at maintaining the barriers to Russian entry.
However, by a tremendous political leap$ the Soviet Union rev~trsed the

position established against her by her rivals. 3

1

Lfn fact a disinclination on the part of both· the US and the USSR
to prevent the success of the Anglo-Franco-Israeli coalition seems to
have been the active agent~/
2Dib, P. 14.
3Ibid., P. 15.

CHAPTER VI
TOWARDS A THIRD ROUND
The Infernal Cycle.--By April 1, 1967, it had already become
apparent that the Israeli-Syrian dispute was not confined to cultivation
rights in the demilitarized zone.

AIJ tensions grew between the Israeli

and Syrian armed forces, General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO}, appealed on May 4 to the
parties involved to observe the cease-fire and to resolve their differ1
ences through the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC).
Around May 10. President Nasser received four reports from
different intelligence services - his own, the Soviets, the Syrian and
the Lebanese - concerning the Israeli deployment of troops along the
Syrian borders.

The contents of the reports convinced Nasser that an

Israeli attaek to overthrow the Syrian regime was imminent.

2 Further-

more, a declaration by the Israeli officials published by the British
news on May 12, affirmed Israel's intention to overthrow the Damascus
regime.

General Ra.bbin admitted;

the activities of the Feda;yeens.

ttwe have tried everything to prevent
ife are left vi th no other choice but

to overthrow the Damascus regi~. " 3
denied
1

~

However, the Israeli Government

such concentration of troops on the border.

Rouleau, 3e Comba~_, P. 74.

2Ibid.

3Ibid.
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Whether Israel in fact contemplated an attack on May 17, as Nasser
expected, or later, is difficult to know for sure.

Nonetheless, Nasser

was convinced that the crucial hour was approaching •1

Israeli officials

had not denied their intention of attacking the Ba'athist regime of
Syria.

Furthermore, reprisal operations had become progressivelyla.rger

since July-August, 1966.

Military clashes had multiplied to culminate

in the aerial raid of April 7, 1967, on Syria.

These attacks did not,

however, prevent the incursion of Syrian trained Fedayeens into Israel. 2
Regarding the question aa to what convinced Nasser of an Israeli
attack~

it is as well to explore the factors which played a part in

shaping the events of June, 1967.

The ever-presence of the 1956 joint-

invasion of the Anglo-Franco-Israeli on Egypt had instilled the fear that
Israel would try again, should the opportunity arise. 3 The apprehension
provides the background to the event that followed during the Spring of

1967. Both Egypt and Syria were convinced that Israel was ·preparing for
another attack.

Levi Eshkol' s warning that Israel would carry out

military retaliation against Syria was considered serious by both Egypt
and Syria, mainly because of the Israeli retaliation against the
4
JordaniM. village of El Sammu in November, 1956.
Furthermore, the
absence of heavy

milit~J

equipment during Israel's Independence Day

l

Rouleau, P. 74.
2
Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis (New York: ,
Columbia University Press, 19681, P. 15

3John s. Badeau, "The Arabs, 1967," The Atlantic, CCXX (December,
:!.967), P. 102.
4
Rouleau, P. 74.
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parade added to their suspicions, that the troops might be deployed
along the Syrian borders.

This suspicion was confirmed by the Soviets

in May, 1967,

when they detected a concentration of military equipment
1
along the borders o:f' Syria.
In the light of these facts, Egypt's :fear that the United States
and Great Britain might be induced to take measures similar to those
taken in 1956 can be understood.

Egypt's relations with both the United

States and Great Britain had deteriorated steadily in the mid-sixties;
American aid to Egypt had practically stopped and by 1967 President
Nasser

was

convinced rightly or wrongly, that American Arab policy had

taken on an unfavourable trend, undermining his position.
By

2

contrast, American support of Israel, together with the memory

of' the 'carefully concealed Anglo-French involvement' in the 1956
incident, seemed reasonable grounds tor confirmation ot the Arab suspicion that an Anglo-American connivance lay behind Israel's alarming
pronouncements and reported military deployment along Syria's borders. 3
Egypt's main preoccupation

s~ema

to have been her determinationnot

to be caught by a surprise attack, as had happened in 1956.

Nasser also

hoped that the world community, through the United Nations, would not
allow another outbreak of hostility between Israel and the Arab states.

4

Although the bitter experience of the Suez crisis provided the
1 Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), P. 28.
2

J2& War

Badeau, P. 69.

3Ibid.

4Ibid.
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framework within which the Arabs took action during the months of May
1967, there were other important considerations which bore directly on
the Arab relations as a whole, and Egypto-Syrian in particular.

1

After Syria's secession from the U.A.R., in 1961, both Syria and
Egypt engaged in a prolonged cold war and rivalry, each contending to be
the true heir of the Arab Revolution.

Syria and its Ba'ath Party con-

sidered itself as the apostle of Arab socialism.

On the other hand,

Nasser claimed to be the symbol of Arab unity and Arab Revolution but
was rejected by the Syrian Party.

Syria had based her claim to such

leadership on her firm stand with regard to Israe1.

2

From Egypt's point of view, Syria's policies towards Israel could
neither be overtly repudiated nor wholeheartedly pursued.
Syrian dilemma became more than a problem of Arabs
became the enfant terrible of Arab unity.

Thus, the

vis-~-vis

Israel;

it

However, after five years of

tension, Egypt took the initiative ;;.ad created an entente cordiale with
Syria, which resulted in a defensive alliance in 1966. 3
Viewed trom the perspective of' Israel's relations with her neighbours, this alliance could rightly be interpreted aa a move against her.
Ironically, it was in fact conceived as a device to curb Syria's
relentless actions against Israel, which might involve Egypt in an unwanted conflict.

The same line of reasoning was behind the creation of

the United Military Command;

~eau, P. 69.
2

Jbid.

3Ibid.

Egypt was to take over the command of the
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Arab armed

~orces

in order to prevent any unilateral action against

Israel. 1
At the peak

o~

the tension between Syria and Israel, in the Spring

of' 1967, vben S,ria vas severely" attacked by Israel, it vas Syria vbo
pressed Egypt to comply with her commitments.

Thus, Egypt vas drawn

into this conflict by the aggressive policies of' Syria towards Israel.

2

Another reason f'or Egypt's action, independent of' the Suez-phobia,
vas the precarious position of' Egypt vis-a.-vis the rest

o~

the Arab

World.
With the secession of' Syria f'rom the U.A.R., in 1961, and Egyptian
setbacks in Yemen, Egypt's position of' leadership was gravely underuni~ied

military command

~g&JJ

mined.

The Egyptian sponsored

tv f'ill

apart.

The divisions in the Ar&b League were so pronounced that Arab

states could not agree on a summit meeting to discuss their problems.
Thus, Egypt ~ound itself' isolated f'rom the reat of' the Arab world. 3
As the largest Arab St&te, Egypt •s influence could not be ignored
in Arab politics, a
dent Nasser.

~ctor

which vent beyond the personality of Presi-

Egypt, being the birth-place of the Arab Revolution and

the crossroads of international relations, and having the largest armed
forces, vas undoubtedly an important Arab state not to be by-passed in
intra-Arab politics.

4

1

Rouleau, P. 69.

2

Ibid.

3Ba.deau, P. 70.
4Ibid., P. 78.

In terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967, the ingredients of
a crisis were present "in the situation and in the Arab suspicion of
Israel's intent." 1

However, as the crisis developed, Egypt may have

seen an opportunity to regain its natural leadership of the Arab world. 2
It seems that President Nasser did not wish for war, possibly because a
good portion of his troops were engaged in Yemen, he chose instead, a
course mid~ between war a.nd no war - that of dissuasion. 3 He
publicly dramatized the situation:

he ordered the troops to march in

unity through the streets of Cairo, in a manner reminiscent of the French
troops parading through the Place de la Concorde, on their way to the
German trontier!
border.

4 Similarly the Egyptian troops reached the Israeli

For the bluff to appear serious, Nasser felt obliged. to deJ11&nd

the withdrawal of the United Nations troops which were stationed on the
borders of the two countries.

However, as a turther precaution, Nasser

did not personally request U Thant to withdraw the troops.
would have taken on an official and irreversible character.

This step

Instead, the

request WR.s conveyed to General Rikh;ye, Commander of the UN forces, by
his Egyptian counterpa.rt. 5 On

May

16, General Rikhye received a letter

from General Fs.vz;y, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed

~oules.u, P. 76.
~au,

P. 78.

3Ibid.

4Rouleau, P. 76.
5'Badeau, P. 78.
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stating:
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I have m:y instructions to all U.A.R. armed forces to be ready
for action against Israel, the moment it might Ca.rl"'J out any
aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these
instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our
Eastern borders. 1
The UNEF WithdrawaL--On l-1a.y 18, th.: Egypt.:i'9.n Government formally
requested the tJN Secretary-·Genera.l to vi thd.raw the UN Emergency Force
troops from its territory.

2

The UNEF had been successfUl in creating a

buffer zone along the Gaze. Strip and at Sharm-el-Sheilth, near the
entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, for eleven yea.rs. 3
Following U Thant's agreement to the request for withdra.va.l, Egypt
on Mey 23, declared the Gulf closed to Israeli shl,ping and any other
ships carrying strategic goods to Israel.

4

The Secretary--General, upon

his arrival in Cairo, warned President Nasser of the "dangerous consequences" which might follov f:t"Q..?- his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. 5
In a speech given on the occasion of the Egyptian Air Force Day,
on May 23, President Nasser summed up his position:

6

On May 12, a very J.lC.IJt.~. tinen·t :ata.tement was made that Israeli
Comtna.nders have announced that they would carry out military
operations against Syria. in order to occupy Damascus and overthrow
the Syrian Government. On May 13, we reeei ved accurate inf'orma.tion
that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces
of about 11 to 13 brigades. The decision made by Israel at this
time was to carry out an aggression against Syria on May 17. On
lunited Nations, Document (A/6669, May 18, 1967), P. 4.

2
Ibid.

3tal1, P. 15.

4united Nations,

Document (A/6672), P. 20.

5Ibid.

6The New York Times, May 23, 1967, P. 2.
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May 14, we took our measures. The forces began to move in the
direction of Sinai to take up position • • • On May 16, we requested
the withdrawal. of the IDi Emergency Force ••• If' there is a true
deBire tor peace 9 we say that we also work for pea.ce. But does
peace mean that we should ignore the rights of the Palestinian
people because of' lapse of' time? 1
The late Israeli Prime Minister, speaking at a press conference at
Tel-Aviv on May 5, blamed the Arab states for starting the war, declaring that Israel had informed the Security Council that she vas only
invoking Article 51 of' the tl'N Charter, which permits the right of' member
states to act in self-defense, and that Israel was fighting to "trustrate the attempt of' Arab armies to capture our land, to break their
vall or encirclement and the seige of' aggression that has been established around us."

2

Similarly, Moshe Drqa.u,

Is~l 's

then newly appointed Defense

Minister, declared in a radio message on June 25:
territorial conquest.

"we have no aim at

Our sole objective is to bring to nought the

attempt of' the Arab armies to eonquer our country 9 and to destroy the
encircling blockade and aggression." 3 Both the United States and the
United Kingdom declared their intention of' pursuing a neutral course in
the conflict;

the United States, however, was soon to modify its stand

in the conflict.

France reinforced her neutrality, on June

5, by

announcing a suspension of' shipnents of' military equipm.ent to the Middle
East.

4

·~he New York Times,

May

23, 1967, P. 2.

2.rbe New York Times, May 5, 1967, P. 2.

3Ibid.
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&
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Moreover, the failure of' the Advisory Committee to request an
immediate session of the Gener'1l Assembly with regard to the situation,
was an admission of the inef:fecti veness of such forces in the light of

the terms of ita mandate contained in Resolution 1001 (ES-1). 1
After meeting vith the Advisory Committee of UNEF on

M~

18,

U Tha.nt stated that he had no alternative but to comply with the U.A.R. •s
request.

Some rep:reaentatives telt, however, that the Secretary-General.

should have clarified

previously~

with the Government of the U.A.R., the

precise meaning of' its requeat that the wi thdraval of the UNEJ' should
take place "as aoon aa possible. "

2

On May 16, the :Sritish ll'oreiSQ. Secretary, George

Brown~

apea.king at

a dinner for the Ul Association in London, assailed U Thant' s decision to
vithdrav the UIEll', sqing "it really makes a mockery of the peacekeeping force of the United. Nationa if', as soon as tension rises, the UN
force is told to lea:ve ••• indeed, the collapse of UNEF might well have
repercussions on other UN peace-keeping forces, and the credibility of'
the United Nationa's etf'orts in this tield are thrown into question.• 3
Similarly, Levi Eshkol, in hi a address to the K.nesset, on May 22,
criticised U Thant'a precipitous action on the basis that the former
Secretary-General~

the late Dag Hammarskjold, had assured Israel that on

1Hal. Kosut (eel. ) , Israel and the Arabaa the June 196 War (New
York: Facta on File Publicatioo, 19 8 , P. TO.
2

Uni ted Nations, General Assembly, A reJ20rt prepared by the
Seeretarz::G!neral on the Withdrawal of' the UNEF, (A/6730, June 3, 1967),
P.

8.

~. Sunday Times {London) , May 25, 1967, P. 2.

a

deci~ion

to withdraw the UNEF it would be "the Secretary-General's

obligation to inform the Advisoey Committee on the UNEF, which would
determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the
Assembly. "

1

The text of the request did not make it explicit that a total withdrawal of the UN forces was demanded;

nor was 8:llY :mention :made of the

"blue caps being repl.aced by the lg.vptia.n forces at Charm-el-Sheikh. "

2

At this stage# the whole affair was stUl a purely local matter.

...

General Rikhy'e replied, "I am not authorized to take such a measure'
President lfuaer alone has the right to make such a request from
U Tha.nt. "

3

At this point# Nuser had no other choice than to put for-

ward to U Thant the demand for ri thdrawal.

It should be noted that the

demand tor withdrawal of the UIEJ' troll Charm-el-Bheikh was not mentioned.
All evidence points to the fact that Preaident Iasser did not intend, at

this stage at least, to close the straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation.
U Thant' a reaction, to sq the least, was surprising.

4

Since the

UltE:F could not be ahitted around without undermining its effectiveness,
U Thant ordered the total withdrawal ot the t.JNEP from Egypt.

quently, the withdraval of the

Uif.ll;lJ'

Conse-

drama.tiaed the alread,y tense situa-

tion in the area and changed the Israeli attitude in favor of war.

~e Jerusa.lem Post Weekly, December 2, 1968, PP. 10-11.
2

Rouleau, P.

3Lal.l, p. 21.

4!Ell·

11·

Until

then, Israel was convinced that, being involved in Yemen, Egypt would
not risk a military confrontation with her. 1

Pi3" his action, U Thant J?Ut Kaeser in an extremely embarrassing
situation;

President Nasser had no choice but to request the total

withdrawal of the UNEF. 2
Once again, the Secretary-General behaved in a curious WB.Y\c
instead of couulting the :Big Powers or convening the S.curity Council,
he co:aplied with Nasser's request without hesitation.

Nasser was

em.povered by the UNEF to ask for its withdrawal but he va.s under the
impression that U Thant, and the United Nations as a whole, would resist
his demand, thus allowing him to set forth his strategy and launch the
diplomatic crisis as he wished.

However, the Seoretary-Qeneral. 's rash

decision came as a great surprise to the Es:Y"Ptia.n officials , including
Buser.
Two contradictor.y bypotheses

behaviour;

~ere

presented to explain U Thant's

some believed that he wished to put the Americans in a diffi-

cult position in the Middle East, in order to force a progressive

diae~t in Viet lla.m.; 3 the other

group held the view,

however~ that

he had been encouraged. by the Americans, who wished to call Nasser's
bluff and to strike a blow at his prestige.

The upholders of the latter

hypothesis believed that the Americans had wanted

~Jasser' s head~

so to

luri Avnery, Israel Without Zionistss a Plea for Peace in the
Middle Eut (New York: The MacMillan Company, 19~8), P. 25.

2Rouleau, P. 78.

3Ibid.

,.
7j
speak .. f'or some time .now and knew that the time was ripe to humiliate

him and possibly, bring about his downf'all. 1
On the other side of' this complex political network were Nasser's
opponents who, from the outset, looked suspiciously upon the UNEF as th.e
foreign force stationed on Egyptian soil, for the sole purpose of'
assuring the right of navigation to Israeli shipping in the Strait of'
Tira.n.

Thq would not have hesitated to discredit Nasser, in tront of

the Arab masses, for such duplicity.
pressures and allegations.

2

Nevertheless, Wasser resisted auch

He. also .knew that the closure of the Strait

of Tiran would be considered a 9.!!..\Mt belli by Israel.

He ha.d expressed

some apprehension to the Syrian artd Iraqi officials who were at a conference in Cairo, in April 1963.

They had suggested to :Nasser that "it

we.s time to demand the withdrawal of the UBEF. n 3 It was humiliating
that the Arabs, after the Suez expedition of 1956, still encouraged
Israel's comm.ercial relations with Atrlca and the rest of Asia.

"You

must prevent Israel's ships passing through the Strait of Tiran. "

4 To

these requests, Iasser had replied that such an action on their part
would mean an invitation to open hostilities, precisely at a time when
Arab countries were not in a poaiticm to vin the war. 5 During l96T,

~uleau, P. 78.
2Ibid.

3Ibid., P.

eo.

4Ibid.' p. 81.
5vincent Monteil, "Le Probl~me du Moyen-orient," No. D 4554,
(Gen~ve, 1968), P. 8.

7(

Nasser's decision remained

un~ange4,.

It is quite possible that, U 'l:hant 's attitude may have contributed
a great deal to the outbreak of var. in 1967.
Syria seemed very

real~

1

Also, while the menace to

it may be assumed that Nasser indeed made a

great error of judgement in attempting to intimidate his opponent.

He

paid dearly for this mistake.

On May 15, 1967, Radio .Cairo ofticia.lly announced the deployment ot

the Egyptian troopa into Sinai.
zation other reaerves.

2

On May .16, . Israel ordered the mobil!-

Until May 19, Israel's attitude towards the

Egyptian move, if anything at all, ws.s hardly alarming.

But news ot

Egypt' a transfer of troops trom the Ye%11ftn into Sinai brought events onto

an ominous path.

This was indeed the turning point, when the Hebrew

Government regarded the situation u "very serious. "
The Edito:r-in-Clliet of the

&-Ahra:ln,

3

Moh-.mmad Hassanein Heikal, had

given an explanation of the EQPtian deployment to the etf'ect that it
assumed an "offensive position,•

4 p~marily

to draw Israel's attention

a'Va7 trom the Syrian border over .to the Egyptian border.

"Once the aim

of such a distraction has been achieved, the troops are to return to a
"defensive position," 5
1

Rouleau, P. 80.

~onteil, P. 10.

~eodore Draper, Israel and the World Politics: Roots of the
Third Arab-Israeli War (lew York: The Viking Press, 19E;7), P. 75.
4The Al-Ahram (Cairo) , October 6, 1961, P. 1.
5Ibid.

77
Thereupon, Nasser's statement ,that his troops would come to the
aid of Syria tolled in Israel.

As one Israeli expressed it:

" .•• by

posing the threat to our frontiers. he {President Nasse!:T rang the bell
hidden in the unconscious mind of very Israeli;

a signal which turns

Israel, within minutes, from a pe~eful countr:r into en armed camp. ttl
The Blockade of the_ Gulf of

~·-The

third portentou move

occurred with the Egyptian army taking up their ]OSition in the Strait of
Tiran, filling the vaeuum created by the withdrawal of the UN forces.
This action, whether Ifaaser ve.nted or not, 111eant blockade of the Israeli

ships, and an Israeli retaliator.r measure to open up the Strait by
2
force.
The credibility of the Israeli a.rm;y vas at stake at this point 1
Israel could not a:ftord to retreat. 3

As was feared, Nasser e.:nnounee,d the Strait of Tiran closed to
Israeli shipping on M«1 22, stating that mines had been laid in the
Arter the var, b.oveve:t', it was disclosed that none had been

Strait.

The explanation given :for IUCh a false statement, or the 'white

laid.

lie • , was that Egypt hoped that such a move might prevent Israeli ships
from entering the Strait, thereby relieving Egyptian forces trom the need

to fire.

4 !n ather words, President Nasser's last hope of averting the

w.r unfortunately produced the adverse e.:ftect and accelerated the crisis. 5
1

Avnery, P. 75.

2

Churchill &

Churchill~ P. 30~

3Avnery, P. 75.

4Rouleau, P. 79.
5Avnery, P. 26.

To what extent the Port of

EJ.ath~

whose closure was considered a

casus belli, constituted the vital route for Israeli shipping it is
difflcul t to judge.

However,

a<; cording

to the words of Eric Rouleau, the

blockade of the Port of Elath was not for the Israelis, 'so to speak, a
question or life and death.

Elath handled only 5 per cent of the total.

commerce, while less than 3 per oent was affected by the closure of the
Gulf of Aqaba.

This was because only a fraction of Israeli shipping

passed through this merchant traffic. 1
was

the delivery of petroleum.

What was really affected, in fact,

Here a.gain, until 1956 petrole'Wll was

being shipped through Haifa, which h why the Egyptian Govel"tUU.l.&nt did not
consider it altogether serious when the Israeli Government ta.lked of the
closure as the casus belli.

2

On Mq 22, U Tha.nt sent a telegram to President Nasser, requesting
an interview.

Nasser accepted immediately, hoping that an honorable sol-

ution might be found.

The two men met in a secret session in Cairo, to

wa::r out of the impasse; they reached the following agreement:

find e.

1)

that the parties involved should abstain from actions which
might asgravate the already tense situation;

2)

that a special representative should be nominated to mediate
between Cairo-Tel-Aviv concerning a solution to the Tiran
conf'lict;

3)

that the Secretary-General. should make a.n appeal to all the
ma.ri time powers to postpone deli very of strategic materials
to the Port of' Elath ud- reroute them, instead, to the Port
of' Haifa, as vas done before 1956.3

1

Rouleau:. P. 81.

2

Ibid.

3Ibid., P. 83.

A week later, President

Jo~on

of the United States, sent his

special envoy, Mr. Charles Yost, to Cairo.
by P,.esident Nasser himself;

He was not given 'an audience

the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud

Riad, met him and an agreement on the three following points was concludedt
a)

The problem must be solved through diplomatic channels
and in a pacific manner.

b)

Egypt would have no objection to the Ti~ case being
present<!id to the International Court of Justice, in the

Hague.
c)

~u· -".:':t:t. t-1oheiuddin, the First Vice-President of the
Republic, should go to Washington for nertiations :for
a compromise acceptable to both parties.

A:tter giving assurances that Israel would not attack as long. aa the
diplomatic channels remained open, Charles Yost lett Cairo on Saturday',
June 3, precisely two days prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 2
Meanwhile, war propaganda was used in an attempt to avert the impending confrontation, by impressing the Israeli Government or the superiority of the Arab army and enabling Nasser to win a bloodless victory.
It bad, indeed the opposite affect in Israel.

Likewise, as a possible

means of avoiding imminent war, Nasser signed a military pact with Jordan.
This hasty military alliance was the decisive

ra~cor

in Israel's decision

to go to war. 3
In the wake of the

Egypto-Jo~ian

defense pact, the Israeli

Government, until then torn between the hawks and the doves, decided to

~ouleau, P. 83.
2walter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem: the Orj_g!n_s of the ArabIsraeli Connict 1967 (New York.: The M8.C!L'1illa.n Company, 1968), P. 1T4.
3Ibid.

-,

'j

go to war.
post

or

Moshe Dayan, the most anti-Arab Israeli, was appointed to the

Derense Minister.

Milita.ry plans were made in no time, and

Israel was ready to strike.

1

President Nasser's May 28 Pr!BB Conrerence.--In his Press Conrerence, President Nasser suggested that a reactivation
Israeli Armistice Commission was becoming necessaroy.
result in the withdrawal
two sides

or

or

the frontier.

or

the mixed Egypto-

This move could

both the Egyptian and Israeli troops "rrom the
He also requested a global conference on the

Palestinian issue and negotiation on the pending problem by the mediating
powers.

2

He also pointed out that the Tiran Con-rlict had but a secondary

position in the Arab-Israeli conflict:

that "the issue which is precipi-

tating the war is neither the Gulr of Aqaba nor the Strait

or

Tiran nor

the withdrawal of the UNEF but the rights of the Palestinian people." 3
In the final analysis, the Aqaba crisis had three phases:
1}

2)
3)

President Nasser',s bluff to divert an attack against
Syria;
the escalation which brought them to the edge of war;
President Nasser'.s mad hope or trying to evade war by
drawing a major political victory: that ot keeping the
sovereignty over the Strait of Tiran, in exchange for
certain concessions to Israel. This was, in fact, t~e
purpose of Zak.aria Moheiuddin' s visit to Washington.

Likewise, Nasser had dreamed of a global negotiation.

Cairo of-

ricials believed that Nasser was ready to :make concessions in view
1

Avnery, P. 30.

2

Rouleau, P. 83.

3.rbe

New York Times, June 10, 1967, P. 2.

4Rouleau, P. 91.

or

the

globa.l discussions, from which he h&d hoped to emerge, once again,
strong in the eyes of the Arab world.

1

The 1956 crisis, in facts had

bestowed upon Nasser the stature of a national hero and an undisputed
leader of the Arab world.
2
from this arisia.

l

Rouleau, P. 91.

2

Badeau, P. 87.

This, too, vas what he vas hoping to regain

CHAPTER VLI
THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
~he

Six.,-D!l Wa.r.-On June 5, 1967, Israel practically destroyed

Egypt's aviation, on the ground.

In six days her trpops occupied Sinai,

the Gaza Strip, vest of the Jordan river, the Syrian zone of Qanetra and
the Old City of Jerusalem.

Why?

The pretext vas the closure of the

Strait of Tiran by Egypt and the withdrawal of the United Nations EmergBut Egypt had not signed, in March 1957,

ency Forces trom the Ge.za Strip.

the agreement on the Rights of Navigation in the Strait of Tiran. for
less than one mile on each side.

1

Moreover, this could not have been the

~-

mentioned earlier, only 5 per cent of the Israeli

belli, 'because, as
exporting commercial

ships and only 2 per cent of the Israeli ne:vy passed Elath.
To stop the fighting, the UN Security Council met almost continuously- from June 5 through the 12, in an effort to achieve a cease-fire
in the area.

Arter the adoption of a cease-fire resolution, in an ad-

dress to the Council, Abba Eban stated that his country welcomed the
resolution, but its implementation "depended on

acceptance and coop-

eration of the other parties," who were responsible for the situation;
that a new Middle Eastern settlement should be constructed after the
cease-tire e.nd must depend upon certain princ.iples 1
·------------~--------------------------------1Jean-Francis Held$ Israel et les Arabes _le 3e Combat (Paris:
11
Edition de Beuil, 1967), P. 91.

82

;.

,,

,~

the first of' these {PrincipleiJ must surely be the acceptance
of' Israel's statehood and the total elimination of the fiction of
non-existence ••• the second, must be that of' a peaceful settlement
of disputes ••• through direct contact.l
It would be well to note that the 'Palestine Conflict', as the
issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past 20 years, was totally
omitted by the Israeli Government in the new would-be peace settlement.
This indicates that, after those years of fighting, the parties to the
dispute had not yet agreed on the real cause of the trouble.
Likewise, Abba Eban questioned the usefulness of the United
Nations Emergency Force, asking "it it is in effect an umbrella which
is taken away as soon as it begins to rain."

2

In short, the Security Council finally managed to achieve a cease:tire and reactivated the United Nations Truce Supervision Office (UNTSO).
The latter was made more effect!ve by the fact that all parties to the
dispute consented. 3
On the other hand, as a result of a letter f'rom the Soviet Foreign
Minister, Andrei Gromyko to the Secretary-General, the Fifth Emergency
Special Session vas convened.

Mr. Grom:yko's letter, dated June 13,

1.967, referred to Article ll of the Charter of' the United Nations, vhicll
authorizes the General Assembly to consider any question having a bearing upon international peace and security.
1

4

Laqueur, P. 124.

~osut, P. 99.

3uni

ted Nations, Security Council, Especial Session on the Midcp.e
East Crisis (Resolution 235, June 7, l967J, P. 11.

4Lall, P. 118.

In the ensuing debates of the, Fifth Emergency Session, the Arab position was defended by the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Mr. M.A. Mahgoub.
On the question of the legalities of the blockade of the Strait ofTiran,
in support of Egypt, he stated that 1
Israel claimed a bellige~nt's right of retaliation on Syria
in April 1967. The United Nations found that Israel vas not justified in this and censored Israel. But, even it it wen junitie4,
Egypt could certainly exercise a comparable and leas blood7 belligerent risht, namely', to close the Strait ot Tiraa to strategic
cargo tor Iarael.l
Furthermore, Mr. Mahgoub assorted that Elath had been occupied
almost a month attar the parties had signed the Armistice Agreement of

February 1949.

Be added that, granting the cause of provocation was

Egyptian propaganda and by the Arab &1'111' vi thin its frontiers, "the action taken by Israel was not leaitimate self-defense, vithin the meaning
of Article 51 of the United :Natiou Charter, bee&USe no armed attack on
her terri tory had in tact taken place. " 2
Speaking on behalf ot Israel,.

011

the other hand, Abba Eban pro-

posed that, "in tree negotiations vith each of our neighbor•, we ahall
offer durable and Just aolutions rebounding to our mutual advantage and
honor. " 3 His statement, despi t. its cordial spirit, le:rt undefined the
more basic and urgent questiou, such aa the tate of the conquered terri tories.

From the perapective of the United Nations Charter - Israel

being one of its Member States. utters such aa vithdraval from the oceupied territories tall within the scope of the United Nations Charter -

~1, P. 131.
2xbid. ' p. 139.

3Ibid.. p. 140

this problem ia not one which could be l.rt to negotiations, unless
thoae negotiations were carried .out within the tramework

N'ationa.

or the United

1

At lea.at, the Fi.tth bergoacx. Seaaion of tho General Aaeembly
achieved, in principle, the agreement of all the parties involved on
the :f'olloving three points:
a4miaaible&

l) .(;Onquest of territoey by toree was in-

2) peace in the Middle East bad long been overdue;

3) treedoll of atatea involved, tram the threat of honilitiea.

and,

2

U 'a!!;t' • R,tfpe of the UNE! W&tl¥\l!'!!l· --Tbe Secretar:y-Genere.l

of the United latiou, U Tb.ant, aulaitted a report on Jue 21 to the
General .Aaaeabl.T, ia defense of .hie Mq

16 decision

to comply with

lgpt' • reqv.eat tor the vi thdra'WIIl of 'he Ulf forces h'om the troubled

area abortly 'before the outbreak of hoatilities.

The report stated

that, " • • • aritioiam of this -.tun would be duasinc to the United
lf.atiou in gennl, and ita pet.c4t:"lteepiq role in :pa.l'ticular. 3 Re
tried to absolve hi.uelt trom the chargee againat hie precipitous aotion whioh aauaed the war in the Middle East.

Re vu &lao ch&raed with

deliberatel.7 ipol'iBC the coatonta of a personal

Aide~ire

of the

late Ul S.Cretar;r-Oeneral, Dag Raauankjold, to the effect that on
Augut 5, 1957, he had pernacled the Ee;T,t>tia.n Qoveruunt to limit ita

"sovereign riP,t in the interest of ••• the UlfEI' operation. •

4

u

Thant

lt&ll, P. 140.

-3u.ited lfatiou, Genel'&l. A.aaembl)r, l)ocument, A Repqrt f"~d bz

2Ibi4. • p. 188.

the Secret!:17':Qener&l U Thant on the With4raval of the
di tional, June 3, 1967), P. 8.
.

b.Di!·

UDPA/T307A4·

declared that the outbreak of hoatil.ities vas not precipitated by the
UJ'EF vithdraval., but by the "continuing Arab-Israeli eontl.ict .. "

1

UNEF'a

effectiveness u a buffer aone vaa lost as soon as "direct confltontation between Israel and the United Arab Republic vas revived atter a
decade, by the decision of the latter to move its forces up to the
Armistice l.ine •••• •

2

This occurred before the formal U.A.R. request

for the vithdraval. of the UN force.
Se also stated that EQ'Pt ha4 the right to terminate t.JNEJ' oper-

ations at «QJ time and that this riaat had.uever been questioned.
Since Israel had retwled to alloY UIEJ' troops on ita soil, the eff'ectiveneas of the UDJ' as a butter force vu vboll;y dependent "u:pon the
voluntary action of the U.A. R. in keeping ita troopa &we:'/ from. the
line.• 3
~.

right of Bs;y'pt to JIOVe

ita troops to the Armistice line,
,
.
therefore, eo\11.4 not be questioned.
Once such a move had t&lten place,
U).l

aa it did on May 17, "UflU eoul4 no longer perform aey uaetul :tunctiou
in ll&intainin& quiet. and its oontinuin& preanoe on Egyptian terri tory
lost ita real. aigaitioanee. "'
Likewise, on the question of .the .blockade, EQ"P't hel4 that, being
at war vith Israel u.d the entrance to the Gulf of Aqab& falling vithin
lunite4 'lations, General Aaaf!flllbly, Document, (A/ 6730 I Ad4i tione.l),

P. 8.
2

-3Ibid., P. 18.

Ibi.d.
4

ill!•,

5Ibid.

P. 12.

her territorial wters, she had the right to close it to Israeli shippin~·

l

impos94

Egpt

also claimed that Israel's risht of punge had been

att~

the joint-attack on the Suez Canal in 1956. 2 Further-

more, the recapturing of the Gulf of Aqaba vu in 1'aet, at leut in the
eyes of the Arabs, a reusertion

ot EQpt • s

BO'Yereign rights away

troa

the grip of imperialism.. 3

The JNJ.XiiiUJa width of the Gulf' is oYer three miles and, u

such,

it vu couidered from a legal point of Yiew to be the 'high seas' •
But, IQPt and ot.hv Arab states .do D.Qt recognise the three-mile limit'
,.

rather, theT iuis't on a 12-aile limit.

Legal experts pointed out that

merchant wssel.s ud perhapa warabipa, too, have the right of puaage
through territorial wa.tersa

an4, " ••• a coastal state could regulate

.

~

the paaaage of ships, but could DOt pNYent th• altogether."

Had the

12-ld.l.e limit 'been accepted by Esnt, the Strait of !'j.ra.n 'WOUld then

have constituted Jc1pt 's territorial waters. 5 llowe'Y'er 1 Israel still
had the ript

ot pusage a.eoordina to XnternatioDal. Lav, vb.ioh spells

out that a sea cu 'be closed, it all the states· surrounding it agree.
Israel, one of the littoral. states, would !30t
the Strait ot tirana

ear•• to the closing of

it appears, tl:&ea, that the blockade of Israeli

ahippiac vu illegal.

Jut, Egpt .4oea not reoop.ise Israel..

'l'herefore,

~ev, P. T4.
~eau, P. 102.

3r.queur,

P. T4.

41'be 8u!l!l;1,1•• (London)~ ";Rights of Sea Puaap," (J\llle 4,
l96T), P. 2.

-

5nta.

and in the last analysis, the question of the blockade is a "political
question rather than a legal one."1
There are tour points regarding the United Nations Emergency
Forces (U.NEF), and ita significant role in the 1967 War, which merit
attention:
1)

UliEF

vaa conceived only u a ta.po%'1.17 measure, vith no

specific duration. 2
2)

Ita aooeptuce

by

Egy:pt, _,a neoeaa1U7 factor in ita creation,

followed by u EQ'P'iian deolan.tion that it 'WOUld "be suided in good
faith, in ita acceptance of the General Assembly Reaoluuon 1000 (ES-I)
of November 5, 1956."3

'rhia atat•ent meant that EQPt was bound to observe the proviai01l8 of the Egypto-Israel.i Armistice Agreement of 1949, including

restraint from raids and the intro4u.ction ot m1i t&r)" equipment into
the area.

Thus • arq action by E&YPt or Israel, by virtue

ot Article VII

of the Armistice Agreement, vas limited in the Sinai area to "defense
f'orcea only. .. 4
3)

The Ul'dted Nations, along with UDJ', should have developed

measures for the stabilization of' a peacetul situation in the Mid4l.e
East.

Thia section ot Resolution 1125 (XI) vas stressed by' the

~. SuaQ.y Times, P. 2.
P. 3.

2united Nations ,

General Assembly, (A/ 3276, :November I+, 1956) ,

3BuJ'na, P. 140.
4umted lations, Oenere.l Aaaab1y, (A/6669,

Mfq

18, 1967), P. 4.

Secretary"-General, U Thant, in his report of Ma;y 18, 1967. 1
4)

The General Assembly made no delegation

the termination of UIEF tunotiou.

ot power regarding

Ia thia case, the riibt of iQ'.Pt,

as the atate Which had accepted UNU' on her soil, made the isaue more
complicated.

2

Iarael, u a. party to the dispute, had retuaed to coop-

erate with the General Assembly and the UliU remained 'stillborn' on
her borderi.

3

Bgypt • on the other hand, ha4 eonaented to the deplO)'Dlent of the
UJlEF troops on her terri tor.r, thu creating a' duality b;y virtue of

wtdch UDJ' 'Could be disbanded either by the General Assembly or bf

Egpt. 4

lr.J.1, P. 12.
2

Ibid., P. 15.

3lbid.' p. 16.

4lli!·

CHAPTER VIII

At the outbreak of hostilities it vas believed that Egypt had
attacked first.

Later events proved that the deeision to strike first

wea taken by the Iaraeli Government. 1 Levi Eahkol admitted this in a
d.eQlara.tion on July 8, 1967, followed by a similar statement by Moshe
J'urthel"JJ10re, Mr.

Dayan.

Per~s,

the Israeli representative at the United

:Nationa, stated that he intended to giTe a broader interpretation to
the notioa ot legitimate defeue.

2

'l'o him, blockade of the Gulf' of'

Aqaba characterised an ag~saion, Which juatit'ied Israel in defending

henelf by military a.ction.

Such reasoning could prove very 4angerous

in circumstances in which the slightest ditrerence of opinion among the
belligerents could constitute a legitimate right to open hostilities. 3
Nonetheless, as mentioned elQ,ewhere, Egypt did not sign, in March

19'1, the .Agreement on the Right ot :Na:rlgation in her territorial vatera
or lese than a mile at her sides...

J'urthermore t Jea.n-rra.:ncis Held.

Preas Correaponclant tor Nouvelle .Obaerrateur, in Israel and an expressed
Zionist sympathiaer., was or the opinion that closure of the Strait of
l

Rouleau, P. 109.

~nteil, P. 3.
3Ibid.

4Ibid.
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Tira.n could not have constituted a legitimate casus belli, since only
5 per cent of Israeli commerce had been passing through Elath. of which

"olllJ' 2 per cat vu Israeli navigation.

What had in f'act. been aftee-

ted wu the f'1ov of petroleum, Yhioh., until 1956, vas coming through
1
R&ifa."
However, it was later learned that Egpt wu even prepared to
2
authorise the puaace of petrolea detrtined tor the Port of llllaim.

oa the other

hand, Syria vu menaoed;

and on M.,- 12 the Israeli

autboritiea 4eoluted their int•ntion ot overthrowing the l>amuCUB
regime, to put a eD.d to the incuniou of the Commandos. 3
Apia, Metorctinc to Jeu-hencis Held, "all. the Iareeli militar.r

pot•ti&l.s wee· aaaembled in auoh a formation that. tecbnicall.y' speak-

ing, it coulcl aot haft been t.rJttbing but an of1"enaiv.. "

4

lov'eYer, it

seeJI8 tkt, a kind ot paychologieltl varfare dis ted for some tiM betweea them, nea prior to the outbreak ot aetual hoat.ilities, u will
be exp,lonct

llhOI'U.J'.

'l'h! P!z!l!1od.cal V&l"1'ate•--l:t ia true that Arab propagaada p.l.a;red

ea UJ....1'ated rol.e in the evoluion ot tlle oriais leading to the 'adrd
~

.AJ'&b-Xsnel.i War ot 1967.

However, iDtem.atioaal political tactora

plqeA aa eq11f&l.l.T importaat part. vtlioh should not be underestimated.

5

It is aoaewtaat aa4 that 'l'el-4Yiv, hall alwap pftfen-ed to retain

~teU, P. 3.
~eau, P. 83.

~teil, P. 3.

~Held,

Le 3e Combat" P. lOT. ·

5Rovl.eau~ P. ~6.
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the bellicose verbalism ot Arab propaganda but to make an abstraction
ot the o:rten reasonable behaviour of the Arab authorities.

1

There is

some truth in the tact that Nasser had increaaed his attempts, ever
since 1951, to a"VOid war vi th Israel.
P'e~eens f'rom

In particular, he prevented the

operating beyoncl Esn>tian terri torr.

For ll years he

maintained the "Blue Caps" on its trontien, to ensure naviga:Uon rigbta

tor Israeli ships in the Gulf or Aqaba despite, aoae bitter clis&~Ne
menta betvettn the Arab leaders. 2 lven on Mq 28, in an interview with
the Preas, President Iasser had &fi'iaed that it was possible to open
up a way tor settlement, if Israel vciuld agree to abide by the UN res-

olut!on.3
It ahoulcl be borne in mincl tl:\at the Arabs consider Israel an
alien a'\ate, created b7 torce in their land as an extension ot toreie;a
4
doJdnation\
and it still reaiu the a)'!llbOl ot imperialism against
their national stN&gl.es.

The Partitioa Plan or the United Ifations,

the Arabs claim, vu carried out apiut the wishes ot the majority ot
the people of Palestine, who coutituted 2/3 of the total population or
the 'Whole area at the time, aad Israel was given t..o per cent ot the
total cUltivable land in Palestine. 0a the basis of 23 per cent Jewish
,owne:esblp.

Mo:recrnr, the votes tor the Partition Plan (UI General.

.Asa.Uly, November 29, 1947) vu ""iwct b7 virtue ot the Western bloc.

laou1eau, P. 14.6.
2

Ibid.

3Ib!d.

4Badeau, P. 103.
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as well as by diplomatic pressures on the "client states. " 1
The Arabs turther claim tbat, wader the United Natiou Charter,

the UN did not have author! ty to diepoae ot their land.

Another factor,

thtV point out • vae Israel's unilatenl. policies tJ'om the

4awn

or its

existence, in defiu.ce or the international communityt

1) On the

eTe

of the creatic:tn or tarael, in 1948, by unprovoked

attaek.s on Arab territories, the . liOJd.at state occupied areas not in2
clu4e4 in the Panition Plan;
2)

Is:rael retwsed to part.iol}'ate in the Ul Mixed Arlaiat!oe Com-

missiOD meetiass.

ru-thel"'llre, atter tl\e 1956 oriais, Israel again

retuaed Ul • s requeat to allow Ul lmerlft07 J'oroes on her borders l 3
3)

Israel repeatecll.y diare~ the demilitarized boun4ariu'

-cn.aent aa4 oftea extended lu.d I'Mlam&tioa beyond those areas.

Tbia

vaa the oauae ot border oluhH with SJria in 1966-1961, Vhioh led,
4
later in the s - year, to opea hoatilities;
4)

'l'he refUgee probl• • • • .rter 'the creatioa or Israel, the

retugee question wu taken up by tl\e Ulf Oener.:L Aaaembly on December ll,

1948, when it wu stated that, "retupes wishing to nturn to their
hosaea U1d live at }ie&ee with their aeipbora sho\114 be permitted to do
ao at the earliest praoUe&l date, aa4 oom.pensation should be paid tor
the property of those choosing not to return and tor loss and
l.a.ct.au, P. 104.
2xbtd.
3nid.

4Laooll'tOUft, P. TT.

damage

to
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property • nl
Israel, the Arabs claim, has .tailed to show any concern over the
refugee problem., nor haa she tried to implement the UN Resolution.

In-

deed, lack ot suoh willingness by the Isruli Govermaent is. interpreted
by the Arabs aa · a sign ot anti-Arabism. 2 ,
The Arabs point also to a s.tiJ;t.-nt .ma4e in l95T by General Yigal.
Allon, then Commander in the North, who said&

"while planning the cap-

ture ot the Arab part ot Sated, it was not our intention to prevent the
tli&ht of the Arab population. " 3 It vas also the aim ot Ben-Gurion and
his Goverr.uaent, to evict the Arab population during the 1948 war, and
4
that by psycholo&ical intimidation, this aim vu aohieTed.
Contrar,y
to Zioaiat propap.n4a, which claimed that .the Arab Govermnents ,issued
proclamationa calling upon Arabs to .leave their holllH, lrakine Childen,
and a few other writers, stated that they .had. examined all the moaitored

broadcasts from. the Arab stations in 1948 and twt not found a aincle

clue implying that auch an ord$l' had been issued. 5
It is true that Israel's tund,a.mental problem is a basic populati01'1 im'bal.a.Dce.

But, the Arab• ,Qlaim that, "it a large increase in

the Arab popula-tion ot tbe country could be ba.laaced by a proportiona-te
increaae in the Jewish population, Israel could, with international
1 Badeau, P. 104.
2Ibid.

-

3Ibid.

4Ibid.
5Goichon, P. 300.
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assistance, oope with the resulting difficulties. " 1 Such a measure
would prove Israel's good faith and would induce Arab eont'idence in
contributing constructively towards a settlement of this dilemma.
Unfortunately, the annexation of Arab Jerusalem not only defied
the United •ationa General Assembly Resolution but also acted as political clynuite, · creating in the heart of Jerusalem the fetus of .Arab
2
reaittance.
b

unticm.ed evlier, the IQ:Ptiana, aa vell u the rest of the

Arab World, vue s\\f'tering from the tra'WIII!L of the Suez Attair.

BQ".Pti&Jui were perauaded that:

l)

The

Israel was an aggreaai ve state

vh!eh aoupt onlT to impose certdn ilolutiou on the Arab world; 3

2)

Iaftel vu a.n expauaioniat atatet

with the conquest of Sinai, the

Gasa Strip &114 the West Jordarl, the Israelis inaisted that there should
'M no Yithdr&Y&l t:rom the occupied territories without a peace settle-

Mat.

4

'This idea vu not onl;r voiced 'by K. Begin, vho voul.d have re-

eatabliahe4 Israel on the historical frontiers of Palestine. but &lao

bf the stataents of Levi Eahltol. General Dtqan a.nd Yigal Allon, "who
eapoued the old Zionist olaia, tbat Israel,

by

scriptual right, should

extend to th• 'bank.& of the Jordan river. • 5

~lph Detsiey, "Uni t;r or Aims," The lcoi).OIIist, Vol. CCXXIV,
Jo. 6464 (July 15, 1967), P. 176.
~torial, "A Matter of :rom,"
6467 (August 5, 1967), P. 481.

The :loonomistt Vol. CCXXIV, Mo.

3Rouleau, P. 50.
4
:&4!torial, "'!'he Araba Ca 't Just Wait, • The Economist, Vol.
CCXXIV, No. 6470 (August 26, 1967) • P. TOT.

'Ibid.
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Moreover, the Egypti&JlS were convinced that the United States was
bent upon the overthrow of the laaeer regime.

The Editor-in-chief or

the Al-.Ahrem, Huaaanein Reikal, aupported th:l.a v:tev in several articles
Which appeared in 1967, to the etreot that the Egypto-American relations

had reached a brealdng point.

Similarl)", when, on April 21, 1967, leas

than three web before the outbreak ot the Israelo-Arab eontliot, the

coup 4' ''M:t in Greece took plaae,. it .wu iJaed:tatel)"

ir~terpreted

in

Egyptian ciMlea u one step closer to'lrari.8 the Mic!dle kat soa1. aimed

at by the UD.ite4 States •1 Acoor4iag .to 't;he cont14ential bulletin ot the
oD11' J:crptiu l'Olitical Party, it wu conjectured that, after the
Atherdaa coup, it ld.pt Yell be the

tl~Z"ft

ot the

Goven~~tent

ot AHhbiahop

Makarioa, beaauae the IQPtiana W\IZ'e oonvil:lced that the .Americus were
tr,riag to eatabli&h a

~8Dt.$t

their chOice to consolidate their

positicm in the luterD MHitel'!'&llean. 2 . It vu reckoned, moreover,
that the .Amerioua would moat probably attack Syyia, the weakest point
in the progreaain Arab world. .After Yb.ieh, they wuld carr:y out their
ulti-.te ob4eatin ot overthroviac .lfuaw•a regiae in Egpt. 3 'l'he day
after the Atheniaa ooup, it w.a tn American toreip polio,. which
Nuaer attaobt4.

Be

ftB

conviQOed th•t .America had decided to 4o away

with the neutral or pro-Rwlaiaa regiaea ell crter the world.
cite the tau ot Sllk.l.:no u4 lf'Kruaab, u an aeaple.

TheT would

They &leo held

that the Aaclo-American policies in Y.aen and Aden were aimed at

~eau, P. 54.
20Ual Abd-al-Nuaer, 'RlaoO't&I"B (Le Caire I

mation du Caire, 1967), P. 50.

3Ibid.

Miaist~re de l 'Ird'or-
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undel'lllining the Egyptian regime.

1

This was atron~ felt in Cairo.

On Mq 8, 1967, when two ~en of the SyTian Government arrived

in Cairo to intol'll Nuser ot Israel' 1 preparations to launch a major
attaolt to overthrow the Damalcua re&Uae, Nuaer heai tated to co&t himself to any help.

Likewise, M&nhal. Aller waa over-ruled, when he urged

'that the Arabs JAWJt strike tint betore actual righting began.

after the USSR

Intellip~c•

2

OnJ.y

S.rri.ce hu oontir.d Israel's iratention to

attaok S,.ri.a, on Ma;r 12, a:nd the .Israeli authorities had proclaimed
their iu:tentioa of overthrovina the Duuoua regime and putting an end
to the activities of the Palestinian Colmtancloa, wu Nuaer convinced
that hi a t\11'11 voul.d be next.

lle had two aJ.ternati vea 1

by

avoiding in-

...olTellleat in the Syriaa &tt'air, .he rialted loaing prestige among the Arab
countrie•t or, by interrening, he rillked being crwahed by Israel. 3
Buser vu eonacious that in .1956 it na •inl7 due to Preaident
EiaeDhover'a interftlltion that
Iaraeli triaagle attuk·.
by

~~

from the Angl.o-J'nmoo-

However, .this sentiment vaa prot0\Ul4ly changed

the introduction ot n.w elementaa

enterprise in B8111\J

wu reacwtd

the nationalization ct private

";he liberation ot Egyptian communists troa prison'

the re-intoraement of relations vith the USSR;

the war in Yemen;

and,

finally', the agi tationa in Aden, which 4ireotly' affected Anglo-American
interests in the Pen ian Gulf.
1

Rouleau, P. 57.

2

Ibid., P. 54.

4 In tact, there had been a rupture of

3Gulal. Abd-al-Nuser, Diacoun, P. 50.

4!!!!_!. • p. 56.

diplomatic relations between Cairo and Washington.

Furthermore. the

American Govel"mmlen.t had stopped deli very o! wheat to Egypt.

Cairo vas

led to believe that the Americans sought to starve the Egyptiana and to
suf'tocate Naaser' a eoonOllliY, in order to pave the
overthrow o! the ~gi.me •

1

Ytq

!or the eventual

Nasser had not 'forgotten the Moslem Brothars'

plot in 1965, supposedly, at the instigation of the C.I.A.
'ro repeat, the Arabs think

ot

2

Israel as au expansionist state.

'l'beir conviction is baaed on it's three vus of expansion&

the expan-

sions of 1948 an4 Israel'• insistence on keeping the territories as war
booty, and the Sinai Campaie;n of 1956.

Fu:~:eermore,

the declarations

made b;y Levi Eehkol that, "we -.re not disposed to cede a single inch of

our l.a:ncl ·• • • • 3 aad elsewhere, he &44e4:
: Palestine had

al.re~

been amputated in the course o! the

:rirst World Wa:r, tol.l.ovina the Sykes-Picot Agreement' a second
tiM durin& the creation of Jor4an by Churchill, and a third time
in 1948. We cannot endure a fourth amputation. It does not leave
1110re' than 20 ,000 ldlomete:ra o! the ancient Palestine, and ve have
to think of' the millions of' JfNS who, in the course ot the next
deoade 'fll em:larate from Ru.esia, We•tern Europe ancl the Unitecl
States,

oan only reoontira Arab belief' that Israel is an expansionist state.
Mono'ftr, Levi l!lahltol oonai&.red not only a part ot Iraq, but also parte
o! Syria an4 '.rreuJordan, u constituting the territory ot biblical

Palestine.

On the basis o! these statements, the Arabs indeed feared

1 aama1 A.bd-al...luser • DiscoUJ:"'I , P. '56. ·
2

Ibid.

~ Monda,
4Ibid.

Januazoy 13, l96T, 1'. 2 ..

99
that , given the opportunity, Israel would realize its dre811!.. 1
On the other hand, since Israel, in the eyes of the Arabs, is an
alien state, created by force in a "country rightly belonging to the
2

Arabs, "

it is understandable that Iasser should request the "ii1i thdra:wal

ot tl'1ID' and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to win the applause of the rest ot the Arab wrld.
'1'o what extellt the Soviet Union wu responsible for the Arab ac-

tion, is not eaa7 to assess.

The Soviet position ia the Security Coun-

cil,. oa the qu.eetion of the blockade, indicated that Egypt had not consulted the Son.et Union's opinion.
by

However, the conf'lict vas veloomed

the Soviets, :l.a so tar as 'the tension had strengthened ·their position

in the Mi44le East, while the United States was busy in Viet lam.

But.

it • • - that the Soviet Union had uaume4 that the United States would
not allow l8nel to engage in open hostiUties.

On

the

oon~rary,

the

Uuited State veuld bring the matter to the attention of the United

Na-.iona Seouri.v Couacil where, the Sarln Union would carey on a diploma:tic oamp&ip in tavor ot the AraH. 3 It is obvious that tbe former
had cmer-estiaate4 the latter's strengthl

in the event of an attack,

the A:ft.b &Z'IO" could at least oarr,y on the battle until Ur.d.ted Nations
intervention bi'Ought the matter to the Security Council for reconsideration.

4
1

It is poseible that, had the United Bationa intervened in time,

Alem, P. 110.

~estler,

P. 29.

~au, P. 70.
4

Ibid.
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Egypt would have scored a

:po~i tical

would have been consolidated;

victory.

Its precarious leadership

and, Arab unity would have been achieved.

This may well be the reason tor Naaaera voluntary plunge into a "game

ot brinkmanship."! Thus the interpl~ of these fbroea auttioea to illuatr&te that, tor three generations, the "Palestine Conflict" has been
a deciaive'faotor not only in intra-Arab politics but also in therela.tiODahip of the Arabs via-a-via Is.:rael.

2

Likewise, much has been said about the reasons underlying the belligerentst motiTes.

It we allow ours•lvea to speculate, it is reason-

able to ueume, on the basi a of the •vidence at hand, that Iasser' s
obj 80tive wu a political rather .than a m.ili tary showdown. 3
He

was comnced that a firm ,stand asaiut what he believed to be

a planned' Israeli attack on Syria Jd.ght exert enough pressure on the
United latiou tor tum.. to oonsidAr a settlement favourable to the Arab
states.

This JM&nt a return; not to .the 1956, but to the 1948 situ~
Furthermore, the aim ot this political manoeuver was not

ation.

ll4~::0a!Jr

to aTU"t an impendi~ Is,.....li invuion but also to provide an oppor-

tunity tor the United lations to :reconsider the entire question ot ·
Pal.estine.t.

~u, P. 102.
2

Ibid.

3~1!.·
4

Alem, P. 112.

CONCLUSION
v As

we have seen, the 1967 War between the Arab states and Israel

was the product

ot a peculiar blend of internal and external forces.

The poet-Suez era, by any

standards~

was not a peace:f'u.l period, &1. though

a precarious equilibrium existed in the area;
aged to refrain trom major hostilities.

the disputants had man-

However, the eruption of ex-

ploaive tignting in 1967 implies the intrusion of a nev factor in the
Middle· Eut balance of forces, which upset the status quo.

1

/Within the context of the int.erp~~ of these a;rnudc forces. the
'
~
1967 War takes on a nev perspectivec/ the Middle East was not only the
aeene ot va.r between the Arab states and I1rael, it vas also the battlefield ot tvo other wars - the intra-Al"ab war and the cold war.

All

three were being waged simultaneously' in June 1967.
To the coaplerlties ot this three-dimensional war, another elaent waa added.

The conscious or unconscious beliefs and convictions

of Arabs and Israelis, forged by the events of the past three generations, bad began to manifest themselves in a aeries of misinterpreta tiona of the intentions of the parties involve4.
Chronologicall.y', the factors ,contributing to the 1967 War were:
l)

a cycle ot raids ud reprisals betveen Israel and Syria; ·2)

Egypt's closure of the Strait ot Tiran to Israeli shipping'
tens• pacts between EQI1)t-8yrla and 18'1Pt-Jordan'

~raper.

P. 3.
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4)

3)

de-

ebangea in the

policies of the "big tvo" vis-it-vis the Arab states and Israel.
None of these by itself could have changed the situation significa.ntly but, together, they exerted enough pressure to tilt the uneasy
equilibrium.

However, "the real casus belli was a struggle against

history. nl But ,
Hiator,y cannot be judged by the application ·or any rigid code
ot etb.in, it can oDly' be represented in the manner of Greek
tragedy'~ where the antagonists are both in the right in their own
terms of reference and in their ovn uniTerse of disooura. 2
In the

trage~

ot nationalism, vbich

of Arabs and JfiWS, the Palestinian drama is a war
has luted

tor three generations and cannot be

solved by the masical formula of a peace treaty, direct negotiatione or
a compromise to meet the demands of each party.

Untortuna.tely, many

contentions between the Arab states an4 Israel haTe been over superf'icia.l matters,

albeit

significant in themselves, they are seconda.J!'T

to the real cause of the war.

Although a remedy' f'or these conniots

un4oubtecll:r help to ease the chronic tensions in the area, it will not
Yipe out the cawse ot the present dispute.
The reason is that. the Arabs' arguments have a solid historical

and juridieal basisa

Palestine had been Arab for 13 centuries and the

!'ormation of the theocratic Zionist state in Palestine vas contrary to
the righ-ts of the people involved. 3
l"urthe%'111Dre, it vu auti-8emi.tie Europe vbieh paved the Ya:'f tor
the birth of political Zionism;
l

Draper, P. 15.

~oestler, P. 23.
3A1em, P. 188.
!

it wu the Ifazi m.aesacre that vas the

foster father of the State of Israel.

In the words of Jean-Pierre

Alem., a detrimental factor ot the drama "is not so DlUCh the presence of
the Jen .• with whom the Arabs have the opportunity of co-habitation,
but the representative of a truly explosive civilization;

a civiliz-

ation:Whioh had never been known.to respect other people and could not
e:x;pand without sowing the seeds of disorder and demoralisation. nl
MoaUJ". the Israelis are Europeana themael.ves.

:barlpl.es can be oited

that b-.r vi tneaa to the tact that origin&l Western groups can never

live toaether with indigenous people in reciprocal and haraonious respect 1

South At:rica and Algeriat

in the United Sta'tes ot America

V'bere 'the probl• is ao:re aoute, tha-t of 'the massacre and the contine-

aent of the surviwrs in the Indie.n Reserves. 2
However, as tor Palestine, t}\e inexorable logic of facta dictates
that no room tor a second nation can be found in Palestine, except b;y
the displacement and/or extermine.tion of the nation already in pos••••ion.3
In the last ualysis, the

o~

legitimate rea.eon for Israel's

existence is "bued on the "right of conquest."

However, this praise

also admits the poaaibUity of :reconquest by the same brutal force, the
ript to uproot the problem.

This method would endanger not only peace

in the Middle last but, also, would bave a disastrous effect on world
1Alea, P. 189.
2

Ibid.

~aper, P. 21.

peace as well. l

Finally, it is in the

failur~

to cooperate, egoism and hypocrisy

of Western politics that one finds the germs of the present conflict.
The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, consecrated the success of

the Zionist Organization.

Not only were the Arabs not consulted re-

garding the fate of their own country but they were decieved in the

promise ot independence JDII.de to tQem during the war, despite the tact
that "the mterif rendered Britain a service greater than any that could
be expected in the a&terial. realm. "

2

It is pertinent, then, to conclude that Palesine became twice
promised a:nd therefore "promised to conflict. " 3

l

:.A.la, P. 189.

2Jef:f'ries, P. 60.

3Alem, P. 7.
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APPDDIX A

APPENDIX A
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT' 8 DECLARATION

~

1
THE BEVEN .ARABS

LTh!s Declaration was made in reply to a memorial submitted to
the Foreign Ottice "through the Arab Bureau in Cairo, by sevu Arab
leadvs domiciled in IQPt.
The Declaration was read out ,by an ottieer ot the Arab Bureau at
ot the seven Arab leaden, which bad been specially convened
tor the purpose on June 16, 1918, in Cairo.
a aeetiaa

The text re~ueed here is m:r own rendering of the Arabic text
which is in the posseasion ot one ot the seven memorialists.

In Arab eiroles !,his
laration tc ~ Seven..J

Declara~ioD

is usually known u the Dttc-

DECLARATION TO '1'B SEVD
His Majesty' • Oovenaeu.t have considered the JHJilOri&l ot the
Seven vith great eve. They tul.ly appreciate ~he reuou.s tor the desire of its authors to retain their ILJ.lOrqmity, but the tact that t.be
--.orial is ano~ hu in no way detracted trom. the value which His
MaJesty's Govermunt assign to that doc'UlAent.
The territories mentioned in ,the mamorial tall into tour categories&( i)

Territories vhich YeJ:e tree &ad indepen4ent before the
outbreak ot 1the War;

(ii)

Territories liberate«. troa '!'ukiah rule by the action of
the Arab thellselYe&l

laeorge Antonius, The Arab AwalteDiy.
2rrbe memorialists were J!ta.tiq al.-' Azm.;
Mukhtar al-Bulh; • Abdul-Rahman Shahbandar;
al-Bakri; Hasan Rimadeh.
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Shailth Kamel al-Qusab;
Khaled al-Balda; J'aui
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(iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of
the Allied
(iv)

armies~

Territories still under Turkish rule.

With regard to the first two categories, 1 His Majesty'a Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence ot the Arabs
inbabi ting those territories, and support them in their struggle for
freedom.
With regard to the territories occupied by the Allied armies, 2
His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the memorialists to
the proclamations issued b;y the commander-in-chief on the occasions
ot the capture ot Baghdad (March 19, 1917) and of the capture of
Jerusalem (Deeeaber 9. 1917). These proclamations define the poliey of
His MaJesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regiona.
vhieh is that the tuture soverument of those territories should be
based upon the priaeiple of' the consent of the governed. This policy
vill a.l.wa;ys be that of His Majesty• s GovernJ~Lent.
With regard to the territories in the fourth eategor;y, 3 it is the
desire of His Majeat;r's Government that the oppressed peoples in those
territories should obtain their freedom and independeaee. His Majest:r •a Govenuaeat Yill continue to work tor the achievement of that
object. They are tu.lly aware of the difficulties aa~perils which
threatu those vho are striving tor the Lliberationlf · of the inhabituts of those territories.
In spite ot those obstacles, .however, His Majesty's Government
believe that the difficulties caa be overcome, and they are prepared
to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them. They
a.t"e ready' to consider any scheme ot co-operation which does not conflict with the militar;r operations in hand or with the political principles proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their allies.
'

1 i. e. , the independent states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the

Hejas aa tar north as 'Aqaba! ·
2In June 1918, when this atataent was issued, those territories
comprised the greater part of Iraq (inclusive of Basra and Baghdad) and
the southern hal.f of Palestine (inclusive of Jerwaalem and Jatta).
3i.e., the hitherto l.mliberated portions of Iraq and Syria.

4'!'his

word is obscure in the Arabic source.
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